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I. INTRODUCTION
This Article argues that waivers of tort liability should be permitted in
connection with product sales. Currently, sellers cannot limit their
liability under tort law for personal injuries caused by defective products
even though such waivers are allowed, albeit reluctantly, under
principles of negligence and warranty law.
Comment m to section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts
declares that a products liability claim by an injured consumer "is not
affected by any disclaimer or other agreement, whether it be between the
seller and his immediate buyer, or attached to and accompanying the
product into the consumer's hands."1  Section 18 of the Restatement
(Third) of Torts also provides that disclaimers and limitations of
remedies will not bar or reduce personal injury claims against sellers of
new products.' For the most part, the courts have faithfully adhered to
the Restatement position, at least where ordinary consumers are
involved,3 by refusing to allow the parties to waive tort liability.
4
1. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs § 402A cmt. m (1965). Comment m
declares:
The rule stated in this Section is not governed by the provisions of the Uniform
Sales Act, or those of the Uniform Commercial Code, as to warranties; and it is
not affected by limitations on the scope and content of warranties, or by
limitation to "buyer" and "seller" in those statutes. Nor is the consumer
required to give notice to the seller of his injury within a reasonable time after
it occurs, as is provided by the Uniform Act. The consumer's cause of action
does not depend upon the validity of his contract with the person from whom
he acquires the product, and it is not affected by any disclaimer or other
agreement, whether it be between the seller and his immediate buyer, or
attached to and accompanying the product into the consumer's hands. In short,
"warranty" must be given a new and different meaning if it is used in
connection with this Section. It is much simpler to regard the liability here
stated as merely one of strict liability in tort.
Id.
2. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTs: PRODUCrS LiABumrY § 18 (1998). This
provision declares:
Disclaimers and limitations of remedies by product sellers or other
distributors, waivers by product purchasers, and other similar contractual
exculpations, oral or written, do not bar or reduce otherwise valid products
liability claims against sellers or other distributors of new products for harm to
persons.
Id.
3. However, some courts have upheld waivers of liability in transactions between
large commercial entities. See S. A. Empresa de Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense v. Boeing
Co., 641 F.2d 746, 753-54 (9th Cir. 1981) ("Although the California Supreme Court has
not addressed this issue, the California Court of Appeal and three circuits of the United
States Court of Appeals applying California law have held that the doctrine of strict
liability does not apply between large corporate enterprises which have allocated risks by
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Although most of these cases have involved personal injury claims,' the
prohibition against waivers has been extended to property damage
claims as well.6 Furthermore, even when courts have recognized
exculpatory agreements between contracting parties, they have generally
refused to extend this contractual immunity to claims brought by third
parties, such as employees.7
In contrast, most courts acknowledge the validity of express waivers
contract."); Scandinavian Airlines Sys. v. United Aircraft Corp., 601 F.2d 425, 428 (9th
Cir. 1979) ("Unlike the consumers in Greenman, Seely, and Price, SAS can allocate its
risk of loss equally as well as United."); Idaho Power Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp.,
596 F.2d 924, 928 (9th Cir. 1979) ("We need not decide whether Westinghouse was
subject to strict liability under 402A, but hold that under these circumstances the
disclaimer was an effective defense to Idaho Power's strict liability action."); Delta Air
Lines, Inc. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 503 F.2d 239, 245-46 (5th Cir. 1974)
(concluding that strict liability claim was foreclosed by disclaimer); Keystone
Aeronautics Corp. v. R.J. Enstrom Corp., 499 F.2d 146, 149 (3d Cir. 1974) ("Since the
Code is tolerant of disclaimers and limitation clauses within certain defined limits, that
same philosophy would be equally approving of a negotiated waiver of [section] 402A.")
(footnote omitted); Kaiser Steel Corp. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 127 Cal. Rptr. 838,
845 (Ct. App. 1976) ("We thus conclude that the doctrine of products liability does not
apply as between parties who: (1) deal in a commercial setting; (2) from positions of
relatively equal economic strength; (3) bargain the specifications of the product; and (4)
negotiate concerning the risk of loss from defects in it.").
4. See Wheelock v. Sport Kites, Inc., 839 F. Supp. 730, 737 (D. Haw. 1993)
("With respect to claims for strict liability, David's waiver is thus void as against public
policy."); Greeno v. Clark Equip. Co., 237 F. Supp. 427, 429 (N.D. Ind. 1965)
("Recovery in strict liability is not conditioned on privity of contract, or reliance or
notice to the seller of a defect, and the seller cannot disclaim or by contract alter a duty
which the law would impose upon him."); Sipari v. Villa Olivia Country Club, 380
N.E.2d 819, 824 (111. App. Ct. 1978) ("Therefore, we find that the exculpation clause
here did not function to preclude the imposition of strict liability on Villa Olivia.");
Haugen v. Ford Motor Co., 219 N.W.2d 462 (N.D. 1974), which stated:
It would thus appear that if [plaintiff] should be successful in recoveringjudgment following trial on the theory of strict liability, and this court, on
appeal, adopts the theory of strict liability on the basis of warranty, the
disclaimer claimed by Ford under its Basic Warranty and Limitation of
Liability would likely not be a limitation on the scope and content of such
warranty.
Id. at 471.
5. See Wheelock, 839 F. Supp. at 733 (plaintiff killed while paragliding because
lines broke); Greeno, 237 F. Supp at 428 (plaintiff injured by defective forklift leased to
employer); Sipari, 380 N.E.2d at 821-22 (plaintiff injured when defective golf cart
overturned).
6. See Haugen, 219 N.W.2d at 463-64 (plaintiff's automobile destroyed by fire).
7. See Velez v. Craine & Clark Lumber Corp., 305 N.E.2d 750, 754 (N.Y. 1973)(holding that disclaimer, which was effective between employer and supplier of
defective scaffolding, did not preclude injured employee from bringing tort action
against supplier).
of liability in negligence law,8 including agreements that immunize one
party from liability for personal injury caused by his or her own
negligent acts.9 Such agreements are most often upheld when they
involve recreational activities'o such as automobile racing," parachute
jumping,12 mountain climbing,3 and white-water rafting. 4  However,
8. See Winterstein v. Wilcom, 293 A.2d 821, 824 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1972) ("In
the absence of legislation to the contrary, the law, by the great weight of authority, is that
there is ordinarily no public policy which prevents the parties from contracting as they
see fit, as to whether the plaintiff will undertake the responsibility of looking out for
himself."); Ciofalo v. Vic Tanney Gyms, Inc., 177 N.E.2d 925 (N.Y. 1961), which
stated:
On the other hand, where the intention of the parties is expressed in
sufficiently clear and unequivocal language, and it does not come within any
of the aforesaid categories where the public interest is directly involved, a
provision absolving a party from his own negligent acts will be given effect.
Id. at 926 (citation omitted); see Julie Ann Springer, Comment, Releases: An Added
Measure of Protection from Liability, 39 BAYLOR L. REv. 487, 488-89 (1987) ("Despite
the existence of compelling policy reasons for holding a person to a certain standard of
care in his involvements with other individuals, exculpatory agreements are currently
enforced in a majority of states.").
9. See Gore v. Tri-County Raceway, Inc., 407 F. Supp. 489, 491 (M.D. Ala.
1974) ("[A] release of liability from the releasee's own negligence is valid absent any
considerations of public policy involved in the situation."); LaFrenz v. Lake County Fair
Bd., 360 N.E.2d 605, 607 (Ind. Ct. App. 1977) ("Consequently, it is not against public
policy to enter into an agreement which exculpates one from the consequences of his
own negligence."); Lee v. Allied Sports Assocs., Inc., 209 N.E.2d 329, 333 (Mass. 1965)
("We conclude that the paper which [plaintiff] signed as a matter of law effectively
released the defendant from liability for ordinary negligence to signatories who were
within its terms."); Barnes v. New Hampshire Karting Ass'n, 509 A.2d 151, 154 (N.H.
1986) ("As long as the language of the release clearly and specifically indicates the
intent to release the defendant from liability for personal injury caused by the
defendant's negligence, the agreement will be upheld.").
10. See, e.g., Williams v. Cox Enters., 283 S.E.2d 367, 368 (Ga. Ct. App. 1981)
(participating in 10k footrace); Schlobohm v. Spa Petite, Inc., 326 N.W.2d 920, 926
(Minn. 1982) (using health spa); Ciofalo, 177 N.E.2d at 927 (using swimming pool);
Boehm v. Cody County Chamber of Commerce, 748 P.2d 704, 706 (Wyo. 1987)
(participating in mock gunfight).
11. See, e.g., Grbac v. Reading Fair Co., 521 F. Supp. 1351, 1358 (W.D. Pa.
1981), affd, 688 F.2d 215 (3d Cir. 1982); Schlessman v. Henson, 413 N.E.2d 1252,
1254 (1ll. 1980); Morrow v. Auto Championship Racing Ass'n, 291 N.E.2d 30, 33 (111.
App. Ct. 1972); LaFrenz, 360 N.E.2d at 610; Winterstein, 293 A.2d at 824; Tope v.
Waterford Hills Road Racing Corp., 265 N.W.2d 761, 765 (Mich. Ct App. 1978);
Barnes, 509 A.2d at 156; Solodar v. Watkins Glen Grand Prix Corp., 317 N.Y.S.2d 228,
230 (App. Div. 1971); Seymour v. New Bremen Speedway, Inc., 287 N.E.2d 111, 117
(Ohio Ct. App. 1971); French v. Special Servs., Inc., 159 N.E.2d 785, 788 (Ohio Ct.
App. 1958); Lee v. Beauchene, 337 N.W.2d 827, 829 (S.D. 1983); Corpus Christi
Speedway, Inc. v. Morton, 279 S.W.2d 903, 907 (Tex. Civ. App. 1955).
12. See, e.g., Hulsey v. Elsinore Parachute Ctr., 214 Cal. Rptr. 194, 200 (Ct. App.
1985); Jones v. Dressel, 623 P.2d 370, 378 (Colo. 1981); Malecha v. St. Croix Valley
Skydiving Club, Inc., 392 N.W.2d 727, 732 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986); Cain v. Cleveland
Parachute Training Ctr., 457 N.E.2d 1185, 1187 (Ohio Ct. App. 1983).
13. See, e.g., Blide v. Rainier Mountaineering, Inc., 636 P.2d 492, 493 (Wash. Ct.
App. 1981).
14. See, e.g., Franzek v. Calspan Corp., 434 N.Y.S.2d 288,290 (App. Div. 1980).
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the providers of other less exotic services have also been allowed to
avoid liability for their negligence by means of exculpatory
agreements.1
5
Waivers of liability, or disclaimers, are also valid under the Uniform
Commercial Code. Although express warranties cannot be disclaimed, 6
a seller can disclaim the implied warranties of merchantability and
fitness under the provisions of section 2-316." In addition, section
15. See, e.g., Dixon v. Manier, 545 S.W.2d 948, 950 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1976)
(upholding exculpatory agreement in connection with beauty treatment); Allright, Inc. v.
Elledge, 515 S.W.2d 266, 268 (Tex. 1974) (upholding contract provision between
parking garage owner and bailee which limited owner's liability to $100).
16. See Northern States Power Co. v. T Meyer Indus., 777 F.2d 405, 412-13 (8th
Cir. 1985) (declaring disclaimer to be inconsistent with express warranty given by seller
of power transmission tower components); Limited Flying Club, Inc. v. Wood, 632 F.2d
51, 56-57 (8th Cir. 1980) (concluding that "as is" clause in contract for sale of used
airplane did not exclude express warranty that plane was airworthy); Auto-Teria, Inc. v.
Ahern, 352 N.E.2d 774, 782-83 (Ind. Ct. App. 1976) (holding that general disclaimer
was not effective to exclude express warranty that automatic car wash could be coin
operated); Wenner v. Gulf Oil Corp., 264 N.W.2d 374, 384 (Minn. 1978) (ruling that
express warranty with respect to carryover characteristics of herbicide overrode general
disclaimer); Paulson v. Olson Implement Co., 319 N.W.2d 855, 859-60 (Wis. 1982)
(finding disclaimer to be inconsistent with express warranty given in connection with
sale of grain drying bin). However, a seller can place time limits or other restrictions on
the scope of an express warranty. See, e.g., Abraham v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 795
F.2d 238, 250 (2d Cir. 1986) (upholding time/mileage limitation on express warranty);
Tracy v. Vinton Motors, Inc., 296 A.2d 269, 271 (Vt. 1972) (concluding that a 30-
day/1000-mile limitation in connection with the sale of a used car was effective).
17. To exclude an implied warranty of merchantability, section 2-316(2) provides
that the disclaimer must be conspicuous and must expressly refer to merchantability. See
U.C.C. § 2-316(2) (1989). See Agristor Leasing v. Guggisberg, 617 F. Supp. 902, 909
(D. Minn. 1985) (concluding that disclaimer on back of contract for the sale of animal
feed storage system was not conspicuous); McCormick Mach., Inc. v. Julian E. Johnson
& Sons, Inc., 523 So. 2d 651, 653-54 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988) (concluding that
disclaimer in connection with sale of used bulldozer was ineffective because it failed to
mention merchantability); Lee v. Peterson, 716 P.2d 1373, 1375-76 (Idaho Ct. App.
1986) (holding disclaimer by seller of defective copier machine to be ineffective because
of failure to mention merchantability); Anderson v. Farmers Hybrid Cos., 408 N.E.2d
1194, 1200 (111. App. Ct. 1980) (ruling that disclaimer printed on the back of contract to
sell breeding pigs was not conspicuous). Disclaimers of fitness warranties must also be
conspicuous, but no particular language is required to make a valid disclaimer. See
U.C.C. § 2-316(2).
In addition, section 2-316(3)(a) of the U.C.C. permits a seller to disclaim implied
warranties by selling the used product "as is" or "with all faults," Id. Furthermore,
section 2-316(3)(b) states that no implied warranties arise with respect to defects that can
be discovered by inspection if the seller requests the buyer to inspect the goods and the
buyer either inspects the goods or declines to do so. See id. § 2-316(3)(b). Finally,
section 2-316(3)(c) provides that implied warranties can be disclaimed by course of
dealing or trade usage. See id. § 2-316(3)(c).
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2-719(1) authorizes sellers to limit remedies that would otherwise be
available for breach of warranty. 8 For example, the parties may agree
that the buyer's remedies shall be limited to repair or replacement of the
defective goods. 9 Another common limitation is to exclude damages for
consequential losses if the goods are not up to par.? On the other hand,
section 2-719(3) declares that attempts to limit liability for personal
injuries is prima facie unconscionable, and courts routinely uphold this
presumption.2
Thus, a curious anomaly exists in the law. Negligence and warranty
claims can be waived or disclaimed, even when personal injuries are
involved, but waivers are not permitted for claims based on strict
products liability. This inconsistent treatment of waivers is particularly
difficult to understand given that warranty claims and strict liability
claims may involve the same issues and the same parties. This disparate
treatment of warranty and strict liability claims cannot be defended
either doctrinally or in terms of public policy. Therefore, this Article
proposes that state legislatures and courts modify existing principles of
strict products liability law to provide for waivers of tort liability in
product sales transactions. This Article examines the advantages and
disadvantages of such a change in the current law.
Part II of this Article makes two arguments to justify contractual
waivers of tort liability. The first argument maintains that waivers
promote economic efficiency by allowing the parties involved in the
transaction to shift product-related risks to those who are apparently able
to bear them most cheaply. The second argument relies on the concept
of personal autonomy; since free will and personal autonomy are
essential attributes of our humanity, it follows that individuals must be
free to make choices even when those decisions are unwise.
18. See U.C.C. § 2-719(1).
19. See Jonathan A. Eddy, On the "Essential" Purposes of Limited Remedies: The
Metaphysics of UCC Section 2-719(2), 65 CAL. L. REv. 28, 61 (1977).
20. See U.C.C. § 2-719(3). This provision declares, in part, that "[c]onsequential
damages may be limited or excluded unless the limitation or exclusion is
unconscionable." Id.
21. See Matthews v. Ford Motor Co., 479 F.2d 399, 402 (4th Cir. 1973) (holding
that seller failed to rebut presumption that limitation on consequential damages in
automobile sales contract was unconscionable); Ford Motor Co. v. Tritt, 430 S.W.2d
778, 781-82 (Ark. 1968) (characterizing truck manufacturer's disclaimer as
unconscionable to the extent that it applied to personal injuries); Collins v. Uniroyal,
Inc., 315 A.2d 16, 18 (N.J. 1974) (declaring that limitation of consequential damages
was unconscionable when driver of automobile was killed by tire blowout); Tuttle v.
Kelly-Springfield Tire Co., 585 P.2d 1116, 1120 (Okla. 1978) (invalidating limitation of
remedy in personal injury case on grounds of unconscionability); see also Gladden v.
Cadillac Motor Car Div., 416 A.2d 394, 402 (N.J. 1980) (refusing to give effect to
limitation provision in contract for sale of new car when purchaser suffered property
damage).
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Parts Ill, IV, and V discuss some potential consequences of permitting
waivers of tort liability in transactions involving the sale of goods. Part
III addresses the issue of market failure and describes various conditions
that threaten the ability of buyers and sellers to allocate risks efficiently.
For example, disparities in bargaining power may enable sellers to shift
risks unilaterally to buyers in cases where buyers are not the best risk
bearers. Sellers may also take advantage of information asymmetries
about product-related risks in order to trick buyers into accepting risks
that should properly be borne by sellers. Cognitive limitations pose
another problem; psychological studies confirm that many consumers
suffer from cognitive impairments that prevent them from evaluating
risks objectively, even when they have complete and accurate
information. Finally, risk-shifting arrangements between buyers and
sellers may adversely affect third parties such as bystanders and
employees. Arguably, these conditions, individually and in the
aggregate, would seriously impair the market's ability to achieve
allocative efficiency if waivers of tort liability were allowed.
Part IV examines the economic and policy considerations that underlie
loss-spreading. If permitted, waivers of tort liability will seemingly
violate the principle of loss-spreading by enabling sellers to shift losses
to buyers, instead of spreading them to other consumers through higher
prices. Nevertheless, this section concludes that most buyers also have
the capacity to spread losses, principally by means of private or public
insurance schemes such as Medicare.
Part V focuses on both corrective justice and the distributional effects
of allowing buyers to waive their rights under tort law. Arguably, a rule
that allows risk shifting is inconsistent with principles of corrective
justice, because it allows the sellers of defective products to escape
liability for their wrongful acts and, at the same time, prevents the
victims of such wrongdoing from receiving any compensation for their
injuries. In addition, if waivers of tort liability are permitted, accident
costs will fall disproportionately on certain identifiable groups, such as
accident-prone adults, young children, teenagers, employees, and
bystanders. While these concerns have merit, this Article concludes that
they can be addressed without significantly altering this proposal.
Finally, Part VI contends that any harmful effects associated with
waivers of tort liability can be mitigated by various legal and practical
considerations. First, federal regulatory standards, which cannot be
waived by the parties, typically impose a relatively high floor on product
299
safety. Second, courts or legislatures may employ a variety of devices to
discourage overreaching by product sellers. These include clear
statement requirements and other formalities, categorical prohibitions
against certain kinds of waivers, and liberal use of the unconscionability
doctrine to invalidate unfair agreements. Finally, in many cases,
physical limitations and marketing considerations will prevent sellers
from using waivers even though it is legal to do so.
All of this supports the conclusion that waivers of tort liability would
have a benign effect and therefore should be allowed in product sales.
Consequently, existing principles of products liability law should be
modified, either by legislation or by court action, to allow at least
limited use of these waivers.
II. THE PRIMA FACiE CASE FOR ALLOWING WAIVERS
OF TORT LIABILrrY
The prevailing system of tort-based products liability does not allow
buyers and sellers to allocate product-related risks by means of waivers
or other contractual arrangements.' This rule should be changed to
permit waivers. It would be better for this change to be implemented by
legislation at the state level, but it could also be done by court decision.
Under this Article's proposal, contractual waivers of tort liability would
function very much like disclaimers under warranty law. Just as a valid
disclaimer would prevent an implied warranty of merchantability or
fitness from arising, an express waiver would relieve product sellers of
any duty that would otherwise arise under tort law.
This proposal would also allow for partial waivers of tort liability. For
example, buyers could assume responsibility for injuries that occurred
after a certain period of time, or they could waive their right to recover
for injuries that were attributable to specified kinds of product misuse.
Buyers and sellers could also agree to limit tort remedies. For example,
buyers might waive their right to sue for punitive damages, but retain
their right to recover compensatory damages. Buyers and sellers might
even agree to limit compensatory damage claims by agreeing to fixed
payment schedules or damage caps. Finally, the parties might agree to
opt out of the conventional litigation process altogether by providing for
mandatory arbitration.
The remainder of this section summarizes the case for changing the
current rule to one that will allow waivers of tort liability between
buyers and sellers. The first argument is based on the concept of
economic efficiency. According to this argument, waivers of tort
22. See supra notes 1-7 and accompanying text.
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liability are socially useful because competitive markets can allocate
resources more efficiently than collective approaches such as tort law.
The second argument focuses on personal autonomy and related moral
values. It assumes that freedom and personal autonomy are essential to
our humanity. It also posits that the concept of personal autonomy
supports the right of individuals to take risks. Moreover, personal
autonomy embraces the right of individuals to exercise free choice by
entering into mutually beneficial agreements with others.
A. The Economic Efficiency Argument
Resources can be allocated collectively by the government or they can
be allocated by individual transactions in competitive markets. The
current system of products liability reflects a collective judgment that
most product-related risks should be shifted to product sellers. In
contrast, a more market-oriented system of products liability would
allow buyers and sellers to shift these risks to the party who is in the best
position to minimize them, spread them, or avoid them altogether.
This section starts with the assumption that market transactions
maximize welfare by shifting resources from less productive to more
productive uses.2' According to conventional economic theory,
individuals place different values on goods and services; consequently,
voluntary exchanges increase welfare by enabling people to exchange
less valued goods or services for those that they value more.24 Although
such a mutually beneficial exchange can occur by means of barter,'
23. See Daniel A. Farber, Contract Law and Modem Economic Theory, 78 Nw. U.
L. REV. 303, 310 n.38 (1983-1984) (stating that a market is economically efficient if it
"allocates each resource to its highest-valued use").
24. A particular allocation of resources is said to be Pareto-optimal when no one's
welfare can be increased without harming another. See id. at 312. When the existing
allocation of resources is not Pareto-optimal, an allocative change that makes no one
worse off and at least one person better off is said to be Pareto-superior. See Jules L.
Coleman, Efficiency, Exchange, and Auction: Philosophic Aspects of the Economic
Approach to Law, 68 CAL. L. REv. 221, 226 (1980); Richard A. Posner, The Ethical and
Political Basis of the Efficiency Norm in Common Law Adjudication, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV.
487, 488 (1979-1980). Thus, a Pareto-superior reallocation of resources would be
economically desirable in the sense that the new allocation of resources would be closer
to Pareto-optimality than the former allocation. See JEFFRIE G. MURPHY & JULES L.
COLEMAN, PHILOSOPHY OF LAW: AN INTRODUCTION TO JURISPRUDENCE 182-83 (1990).
25. For example, assume that A likes apples more than oranges, while B likes
oranges more than apples. Assume further that A and B each have five apples and five
oranges. If A exchanges his oranges with B in return for B's apples, then A and B will
both be better off.
individuals in more developed economies ordinarily use money to
purchase the goods and services they desire.26  In the aggregate,
therefore, consumers create a demand for goods and services based on
their individual preferences, while producers attempt to profit from this
demand by providing appropriate amounts of these goods and services.27
Thus, if market transactions are freely allowed, resources should be
allocated to their most desired uses and societal wealth should be
maximized.'
Risks can be allocated in much the same way that other costs and
benefits are allocated. That is to say, the question of what level of risk is
appropriate and who should bear this risk can be determined collectively
by legislatures, administrative agencies, or courts, or these questions can
be left to market forces.29 Arguably, when risks are allocated by the
market, someone will voluntarily agree to accept a risk only when he
enjoys a comparative advantage as a risk bearer.0 On the other hand,
when risks are allocated collectively, it is possible that those decisions
will be influenced by political or distributional considerations and will
not be based on economic considerations alone. If markets are not
seriously impaired, they will generally allocate risks more efficiently
than non-market mechanisms.
These principles also apply to the allocation of product-related risks.
When products are bought and sold, someone must bear the various
economic and physical risks that are associated with their use. Product
26. For example, assume that A likes apples and is willing to pay up to $5.00 a
bushel for them. B grows apples and is willing to sell them for as little as $4.00 a bushel.
If A buys a bushel of apples from B at $4.00 a bushel (or at any price between $4.00 and
$5.00 a bushel), both A and B will be better off as a result of the exchange. The $4.00
price that B is willing to accept represents B's cost of production plus a minimum
acceptable profit. The difference between what A actually pays for the apples and the
amount that he would be willing to pay above the actual price paid represents a
"consumer surplus" that inures to the benefit of A. See Kim D. Larsen, Note, Strict
Products Liability and the Risk-Utility Test for Design Defect: An Economic Analysis, 84
COLUM. L. REv. 2045, 2054 (1984) (observing that the consumer surplus "represents the
positive difference between the price consumers are willing to pay for a product and the
market price they actually pay").
27. See A. Mitchell Polinsky, Economic Analysis as a Potentially Defective
Product: A Buyer's Guide to Posner's Economic Analysis of Law, 87 HARv. L. REv.
1655, 1666 (1973-1974).
28. See Mark A. Kaprelian, Note, Privity Revisited: Tort Recovery by a
Commercial Buyer for a Defective Product's Self-Inflicted Damage, 84 MICH. L. REv.
517, 526 (1985-1986) ('The underlying economic principle is that rational
decisionmakers will make exchanges that maximize utility.").
29. See generally Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Encouraging Safety: The Limits of Tort
Law and Government Regulation, 33 VAND. L. REv. 1281, 1283-319 (1980) (discussing
risk management under free market, tort law, and government regulatory regimes).
30. See Roland N. McKean, Products Liability: Trends and Implications, 38 U.
CHI. L. REv. 3, 31 (1970) ("Voluntary exchange puts the risk bearing on the shoulders of
the person with a comparative advantage in bearing it.").
[VOL. 37: 293, 2000] "Waive" Goodbye to Tort Liability
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
sellers are often the best risk bearers. Their control over the design and
production process enables product sellers, particularly manufacturers,
to prevent or reduce many product-related risks.31  Moreover, sellers
typically have greater resources available for compensation and are also
able, in many instances, to obtain cheaper insurance than individual
consumers. 
3 2
Nevertheless, there may be situations in which consumers have
superior risk-bearing capacity. First of all, consumers vary considerably
in their attitudes about risk. Differences in age, wealth, or psychological
temperament induce some consumers to be risk seekers, while causing
others to be risk avoiders.33 Therefore, it makes sense to offer choices,
rather than treating all consumers alike. Waivers of tort liability satisfy
this objective by enabling risk seekers to assume more responsibility for
product-related injuries, while allowing risk avoiders to retain their
rights under tort law.
Second, differences in experience, skill, education, or product use
patterns enable some consumers to handle some risks more effectively
than others. Thus, the risks associated with a particular product may be
so slight for certain consumers that the economic benefit of a reduced
sale price would exceed the expected harm to them from a product-
related injury. For other consumers, however, the potential risks
involved may be sufficiently great that they would not want to give up
the protection provided to them by products liability law.
Third, many consumers already have adequate insurance against
product-related risks and, therefore, are less concerned about bearing
these risks than consumers who have either less insurance protection or
none whatsoever. Clearly, these adequately insured consumers would
prefer to spend their money on something other than duplicative and
unnecessary protection.34 Furthermore, there is evidence to suggest that
31. See David G. Owen, Rethinking the Policies of Strict Products Liability, 33
VAND. L. REv. 681, 711 (1980) ("Manufacturers today, especially those of products that
are technologically complex, often are in a far better position than consumers to
discover, evaluate, and act upon, dangers that inhere in the products that they make and
sell.").
32. See James A. Henderson, Jr., Coping with the Time Dimension in Products
Liability, 69 CAL. L. REv. 919, 934 (1981) (stating that "manufacturers are believed to
be better able to obtain insurance than are consumers, and are assumed to be able to pass
on most, if not all, of the insurance costs by raising the prices of products").
33. See Donald P. Judges, Of Rocks and Hard Places: The Value of Risk Choice,
42 EMORY L.J. 1, 3 (1993) (discussing why some people prefer risk).
34. See Owen, supra note 31, at 707 (observing that it may not be "fair (or
mahy consumers do not want to pay for insurance against future pain
and suffering. 5 To the extent that tort liability is considered to be a form
of insurance, it forces consumers to purchase protection against pain and
suffering whether they want it or not.3 6 Waivers of tort liability for those
who are otherwise adequately insured would avoid this problem.
Thus, a market-oriented system of products liability can potentially
accommodate a variety of individual preferences with respect to product
safety by offering consumers a wide range of risk-bearing options." In
contrast, the tort system is far less flexible. The initial risk allocation
decision, which places most product-related risks on the seller, cannot be
overridden. This decision will necessarily be inefficient in cases where
consumers are actually the superior risk bearers. 8 Thus, a liability
regime that allows buyers and sellers to allocate product-related risks by
private agreement is potentially more efficient with respect to risk
allocation than one which shifts such risks irrevocably to the seller.
B. Personal Autonomy
The principle of personal autonomy demands that individuals be free
to shape their own destinies.39 This means that people must have the
ability to make meaningful choices in their lives without having to
justify themselves to others.4° The concept of personal autonomy has
efficient) to penalize the prudent consumer who insures himself through health and wage
insurance plans by forcing him to pay again through higher prices to overinsure himself
and also to insure his less prudent neighbors").
35. See George L. Priest, The Current Insurance Crisis and Modem Tort Law, 96
YALE L.J. 1521, 1547 (1987) (declaring that "there is no market for pain and suffering
insurance in any society in the world"); Alan Schwartz, Proposals for Products Liability
Reform: A Theoretical Synthesis, 97 YALE L.J. 353, 366 (1988) (observing that "the
more purely mental the loss, the less likely a consumer will want to insure against it").
But see Steven P. Croley & Jon D. Hanson, The Nonpecuniary Costs of Accidents: Pain-
and-Suffering Damages in Tort Law, 108 HARv. L. REv. 1785, 1791 (1995) (arguing that
"the evidence supports the conclusion that, although several significant impediments
prevent the emergence of a robust market for insurance against pain-and-suffering losses,
consumers in fact do demand such insurance").
36. See Richard C. Ausness, An Insurance-Based Compensation System for
Product-Related Injuries, 58 U. Prrr. L. REv. 669, 691 (1997) (stating that "to the extent
that tort law compensates for nonpecuniary losses, it forces consumers to obtain more
insurance coverage than they would willingly purchase on a first-party basis").
37. See Pierce, supra note 29, at 1283-84 ("In theory, the market... can reflect
any individual's preference for a high degree of safety while simultaneously permitting
others individuals to trade safety for convenience, speed, or whatever else the individual
values more than an increment of safety.").
38. See Kaprelian, supra note 28, at 537-38 ("As a matter of economic efficiency,
allocating the risk of all product defects to sellers by law may prevent the parties from
taking advantage of the buyer's superior ability to avoid certain risks.").
39. See JoHN H. GARVEY, WHAT ARE FREEDOMS FOR? 23 (1996).
40. See Stephen Gardbaum, Liberalism, Autonomy, and Moral Conflict, 48 STAN.
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deep roots in philosophy and political theory. Intellectuals such as
Immanuel Kant, John Stuart Mill, and Friedrich von Hayek have all
stressed the desirability of allowing human beings to control their own
lives.
The eighteenth century German philosopher Immanuel Kant was one
of the first to recognize the moral significance of personal autonomy.
Kant characterized as "autonomous" those creatures who possess the
capacity to make rational choices." According to Kant, only human
beings fit this description. This ability to make free and rational choices
thus enables human beings to act in a moral way, since only voluntary
acts have moral significance. 2 Kant did not believe that individuals are
entirely free to do as they please; rather, they are subject to moral
obligations and duties, and only those who recognize and act in
accordance with moral laws can be considered truly autonomous.
43
Nevertheless, Kant recognized that if human beings are to fulfill their
potential as moral agents, society must respect their right to make
choices, even though these choices might not increase either their
happiness or their economic well-being.44
The nineteenth century English proponent of utilitarianism, John
Stuart Mill, also spoke of the need for autonomy and personal freedom,
However, unlike Kant, Mill was more concerned with autonomy as an
instrument to liberate the human spirit and less with its role in the
achievement of moral rectitude. In his book On Liberty, Mill wrote:
L. REV. 385, 395 (1996) (declaring that autonomy requires that "individuals have real,
meaningful, and valuable options in life and that they enjoy the capacity to choose
among them").
41. See MURPHY & COLEMAN, supra note 24, at 78.
42. See Thomas C. Grey, Serpents and Doves: A Note on Kantian Legal Theory,
87 COLuM. L. REV. 580, 581 (1987) ("Autonomy in Kant's sense is moral self-
government, freedom from enslavement by inclination and desire.").
43. See J.M. Finnis, Legal Enforcement of "Duties to Oneself": Kant v. Neo-
Kantians, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 433, 441 (1987) (declaring that, according to Kant, "one
has autonomy just in so far as one does in fact make one's choices, not on the basis of
one's interests, but out of respect for the demands of morality"); Henry J. Staten, The
Deconstruction of Kantian Ethics and the Question of Pleasure, 16 CARDOzO L. REV.
1547, 1547-48 (1995) ("It is the job of rationality to recognize moral obligation, and the
individual who recognizes it and acts in accordance with it is conceived by Kant as
acting 'freely' or 'autonomously,' which for Kant means acting like a rational being and
not an animal.").
44. See MURPHY & COLEMAN, supra note 24, at 71.
[Liberty] requires liberty of tastes and pursuits; of framing the plan of our life to
suit our own character; of doing as we like, subject to such consequences as
may follow; without impediment from our fellow-creatures, so long as what we
do does not harm them, even though they should think our conduct foolish,
perverse, or wrong.45
In this section of On Liberty, Mill not only identified the social
benefits of personal freedom and free choice, but also pointed out that in
a free society people must be allowed to make what appear to be foolish
or irrational choices. The Austrian economist and political scientist
Friedrich A. Hayek echoed these sentiments in his book, The Road to
Serfdom:
From this the individualist concludes that the individuals should be allowed,
within defined limits, to follow their own values and preferences rather than
somebody else's; that within these spheres the individual's system of ends
should be supreme and not subject to any dictation by others.46
In On Liberty, John Stuart Mill made the following observation: If
society permits people to make improvident decisions, these individuals
must be prepared to live with the consequences if they fail to exercise
good judgment.47 Thus, Mill acknowledged that autonomy could be a
two-edged sword: it offered the prospect of happiness, moral
development, and prosperity, but it also could lead to disappointment,
grief, and economic ruin.
The concept of personal autonomy has not been confined solely to the
domain of philosophers; it has also engaged the attention of political
thinkers and practical politicians since the early days of the Republic.48
Thus, in the Declaration of Independence, Thomas Jefferson declared
that "all Men are created equal" and "endowed by their Creator with
certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the
Pursuit of Happiness."49  Later, Jefferson wrote that "[t]he true
foundation of republican government is the equal right of every citizen,
in his person and property, and in their management." In the same
45. JOHN STuART MILL, ON LIBERTY 12 (Alburey Castell ed., Appleton-Century-
Crofts, Inc. 1947) (1859).
46. FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM 59 (1944).
47. See MILL, supra note 45, at 12.
48. See Gene R. Nichol, Children of Distant Fathers: Sketching an Ethos of
Constitutional Liberty, 1985 Wis. L. REv. 1305, 1343 (contending that "Jefferson's
attempted wall insulating noninjurious acts from government regulation was thus
designed primarily to give broad recognition to the value of human autonomy, the first
principle of self-government").
49. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
50. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Samuel Kercheval (July 12, 1816), in THE
PORTABLE JEFFERSON 552, 555 (M. Peterson ed., 1975), quoted in Nichol, supra note 48,
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vein, Jefferson argued that government must allow individuals to
"regulate [their] own pursuits of industry and improvement" and
recognize and uphold the choices they make.5' Likewise, James
Madison declared that a person enjoys "an equal property in the free use
of his faculties and free choice of the objects on which to employ
them."52 Even today, despite the current popularity of communitarian
theories among academic elites," traditional attitudes about personal
autonomy continue to resonate strongly throughout our political and
popular culture.-4
Furthermore, American courts have long recognized that personal
autonomy is an interest that is entitled to legal protection.55 As a number
of courts have acknowledged, many of the constitutional guarantees
found in the Bill of Rights and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment are designed to protect the personal autonomy of
individuals against unwarranted interference by institutions of
government.56 For example, the Supreme Court has held that the
at 1344.
51. Nichol, supra note 48, at 1348 (quoting Thomas Jefferson).
52. JAMES MADISON, IN NATIONAL GAZETIE (Mar. 29, 1792), reprinted in THE
COMPLETE MADISON: HiS BASIC WRTNGS, at 267 (Saul K. Padover ed., 1953), quoted
in Nichol, supra note 48, at 1344.
53. See Robert M. Ackerman, Tort Law and Communitarianism: Where Rights
Meet Responsibilities, 30 WAKE FOREST L. Rnv. 649, 652-54 (1995) (discussing
communitarianism).
54. See Roger B. Dworkin, Medical Law and Ethics in the Post-Autonomy Age, 68
IND. L.J. 727, 727 (1993) ("To the liberal individual (that is, the typical American),
[autonomy] means the ability and the opportunity to choose one's course of action and to
act to effectuate one's choice."); Jay M. Feinman, Critical Approaches to Contract Law,
30 UCLA L. REv. 829, 833 (1983) ("Notions of individualism still appeal to us, not only
because of the power of our traditions, but also because such notions are, at least in part,
a true description of human behavior and aspiration."); Anthony T. Kronman,
Paternalism and the Law of Contracts, 92 YALE L.J. 763, 794-95 (1983) ("Our society is
committed to the principle that, as long as they do not violate the rights of others,
individuals may pursue their own conceptions of the good."); Rosa Eckstein, Comment,
Towards a Communitarian Theory of Responsibility: Bearing the Burden for the
Unintended, 45 U. MIAM L. REv. 843, 846 (1991) (conceding that "notions of rights and
individualism have deep roots in American political culture").
55. Courts often use the term "privacy" or "liberty" to describe interests that they
consider to be aspects of personal autonomy. See infra notes 56-66 and accompanying
text.
56. See U.S. CONST. amend. I-X, XIV. See, e.g., Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116,
126 (1958) (declaring that "'outside areas of plainly harmful conduct, every American is
left to shape his own life as he thinks best, do what he pleases, go where he pleases'
(quoting Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 197 (1941))); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262
U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (stating that liberty includes the right "to enjoy those privileges
long recognized at common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free
Constitution protects reproductive decisions57 and marital choices.5"
Courts have also concluded that public officials cannot force patients in
their care to take anti-psychotic drugs 9 or to submit to life-prolonging
medical treatments60 Other constitutionally protected aspects of
personal autonomy include the right of individuals to make educational
choices," to travel outside the country,6 2 to control their dress and
personal appearance,63 and to do whatever they choose in the privacy of
their own homes." Moreover, the interest in personal autonomy protects
men"); Richards v. Thurston, 424 F.2d 1281, 1284 (1st Cir. 1970) (concluding that "the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment establishes a sphere of personal
liberty for every individual"); Ravin v. State, 537 P.2d 494, 509 (Alaska 1975) (holding
that the state "cannot impose its own notions of morality, propriety, or fashion on
individuals when the public has no legitimate interest in the affairs of those
individuals").
57. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) (upholding the right of a woman to
have an abortion); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 443 (1972) (invalidating state
restriction on distribution of contraceptives); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485
(1965) (striking down state ban on the sale of contraceptives to married couples);
Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (repudiating law that
authorized state officials to sterilize certain classes of criminals).
58. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (declaring that "the freedom to
marry, or not marry, a person of another race resides with the individual and cannot be
infringed by the State").
59. See Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291, 299 (1982) (assuming a constitutionally
protected interest); Scott v. Plante, 532 F.2d 939, 946 (3d Cir. 1976); Rennie v. Klein,
462 F. Supp. 1131, 1145 (D.N.J. 1978) ("Individual autonomy demands that the person
subjected to the harsh side effects of psychotropic drugs have control over their
administration.").
60. See Bouvia v. Superior Court, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297, 301 (Ct. App. 1986) ("The
right to refuse medical treatment is basic and fundamental."); Barber v. Superior Court,
195 Cal. Rptr. 484, 489 (Ct. App. 1983) (concluding that "a competent adult patient has
the legal right to refuse medical treatment"); In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 663 (N.J.
1976) (holding that the right of privacy "is broad enough to encompass a patient's
decision to decline medical treatment under certain circumstances").
61. See Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925) (declaring that the
concept of liberty "excludes any general power of the State to standardize its children by
forcing them to accept instruction from public teachers only"); Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399
(striking down a state statute that prohibited the teaching of foreign languages in primary
schools).
62. See Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 130 (1958) (invalidating State Department
regulations that attempted to limit the ability of suspected communists to travel abroad).
63. See Stull v. School Bd., 459 F.2d 339, 347 (3d Cir. 1972) (holding that "the
governance of the length and style of one's hair is implicit in the liberty assurance of the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment"); Richards v. Thurston, 424 F.2d
1281, 1284 (1st Cir. 1970) (striking down a high school ban on long hair); Breese v.
Smith, 501 P.2d 159, 169 (Alaska 1972) ('The spectre of governmental control of the
physical appearances of private citizens, young and old, is antithetical to a free society,
contrary to our notions of a government of limited powers, and repugnant to the concept
of personal liberty.").
64. See Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 565 (1969) ("If the First Amendment
means anything, it means that a State has no business telling a man, sitting alone in his
own house, what books he may read or what films he may watch."); Ravin v. State, 537
P.2d 494, 504 (Alaska 1975) (concluding that the right to privacy "would encompass the
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the right of individuals to associate with others in order to advance their
common social or political agendas.6 Finally, courts have occasionally
even invoked personal autonomy interests as a basis for invalidating
excessive government regulation of private economic activity."
Tort law also protects personal autonomy interests against
unwarranted interference by others.67  Torts such as battery, false
imprisonment, trespass to land, trespass to chattels, and conversion have
traditionally protected individuals and their property from the direct
possession and ingestion of substances such as marijuana in a purely personal, non-
commercial context in the home unless the state can meet its substantial burden and
show that proscription of possession of marijuana in the home is supportable by
achievement of a legitimate state interest").
65. See NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 430 (1963) (stating that "there is no
longer any doubt that the First and Fourteenth Amendments protect certain forms of
orderly group activity"); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958) (arguing that
"freedom to engage in association for the advancement of beliefs and ideas is an
inseparable aspect of the 'liberty' assured by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, which embraces freedom of speech"); Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516,
532 (1945) ('The ight... to discuss, and inform people concerning, the advantages and
disadvantages of unions and joining them is protected not only as part of free speech, but
as part of free assembly."); see also Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 622
(1984) (declaring that "we have long understood as implicit in the right to engage in
activities protected by the First Amendment a corresponding right to associate with
others in pursuit of a wide variety of political, social, economic, educational, religious,
and cultural ends").
66. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 53 (1905) ('The general right to make
a contract in relation to his business is part of the liberty of the individual protected by
the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution."), overruled by Day-Brite
Lighting, Inc. v. State, 342 U.S. 421 (1952); Noble v. Davis, 161 S.W.2d 189, 191 (Ark.
1942) ('The legislature has no power, under the guise of police regulations, arbitrarily to
invade the personal rights and liberty of the individual citizen, to interfere with private
business or impose unusual and unnecessary restrictions upon lawful occupations, or to
invade property rights."). It must be admitted, however, that courts are now much more
tolerant of state economic regulation. See Williamson v. Lee Optical, Inc., 348 U.S. 483,
487-91 (1955) (upholding state law that prohibited opticians from fitting eyeglasses
without prescription from ophthalmologists or optometrists); Day-Brite Lighting, 342
U.S. at 424-25 (upholding state statute that required employers to allow employees time
off with pay in order to vote in elections); Olsen v. Nebraska, 313 U.S. 236, 243-47
(1941) (upholding state law that limited fees charged by private employment agencies);
West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 386-88, 400 (1937) (upholding state
minimum wage law for women); Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 509 (1934)
(upholding state regulation of whole-milk prices); see also Robert G. McCloskey,
Economic Due Process and the Supreme Court: An Exhumation and Reburial, 1962 SUP.
CT. REV. 34, 36-40 (discussing the decline of substantive due process as a limitation on
economic regulation).
67. See Judges, supra note 33, at 63 (contending that tort law "generally seeks to
protect the autonomy of plaintiffs by compensating for and deterring the forced
intrusions of defendants' tortious conduct").
309
application of physical force. Moreover, in recent years some tort
doctrines have emerged that more explicitly vindicate personal
autonomy. Perhaps the most significant of these new doctrines is that of
informed consent, which requires physicians to fully inform patients
about the risks and benefits of alternative types of treatment6 Arguably,
the duty to warn in products liability law6 is also intended, at least in
part, to protect personal autonomy.70
As the foregoing discussion has suggested, the concept of personal
autonomy permits individuals to do many things as long as their
activities do not harm others. However, two additional aspects of
personal autonomy are particularly relevant to the waiver of liability
issue: the first involves voluntary risk-taking and the second involves
freedom of contract.
Risk-taking is part of human nature; we routinely take risks in our
daily lives.7' Some individuals voluntarily assume risks for efficiency
reasons-because the expected gain from a particular choice appears to
them to outweigh its expected losses. Such risk-taking is properly
justified on grounds of economic efficiency. For other people, however,
taking risks is not just a matter of economic efficiency; it is also an
exercise of their personal autonomy. 2 For these individuals, having the
power to encounter physical risks provides immense psychic satisfaction
and, more importantly, helps to define their identity, character, and
personality." Many of the great explorers, military figures, and
adventurers of yore exemplify this spirit of freedom and self-reliance.7
Even today, many people engage in potentially dangerous sports such as
mountain climbing, white-water rafting, skydiving, automobile racing,
bungee jumping, and hang gliding. For these people, risk-taking is an
affirmation of their personal autonomy and independence.
Finally, the principle of personal autonomy supports the right of
68. See Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 781 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Truman v.
Thomas, 611 P.2d 902, 906 (Cal. 1980); Largey v. Rothman, 540 A.2d 504, 506 (N.J.
1988); Scott v. Bradford, 606 P.2d 554,556-57 (Okla. 1979).
69. See generally M. Stuart Madden, The Duty to Warn in Products Liability:
Contours and Criticism, 89 W. VA. L. Rnv. 221 (1987) (discussing the duty to warn).
70. See Peter H. Schuck, Rethinking Informed Consent, 103 YALE L.J 899, 913-16
(1994) (discussing the duty to warn in products liability law and its relation to the
concept of consent).
71. See Susan Rose-Ackerman, Progressive Law and Economics--and the New
Administrative Law, 98 YALE L.J. 341, 355 (1988).
72. See Judges, supra note 33, at 3.
73. See id.
74. Among military figures, Alexander the Great, Julius Caesar, and Napoleon
come to mind as commanders who were willing to take chances on the battlefield.
Explorers, such as Ferdinand Magellan, Sir Richard Burton, and Sir Henry Stanley, were
also risk-takers. Adventurers, who carved out empires in North and South America
against great odds, include Hernando Cortes, Hemando de Soto, and Francisco Pizarro.
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individuals to maximize their economic welfare by entering into
contractual agreements with others.75 If each individual is morally
entitled to utilize property in a way that increases wealth, it follows that
two or more persons should be able to enter into mutually beneficial
exchanges or agreements in order to achieve this same goal.76 Indeed,
courts have affirmed this notion of freedom of contract on numerous
occasions, particularly when no countervailing governmental interest is
directly involved.?
Personal autonomy is an important moral value for most Americans.
This principle supports the fights of individuals to take risks and contract
with each other in order maximize wealth. Consequently, risk seekers
and risk creators should be free to contract with each other in order to
shift risks, including the risk of personal injury, in whatever manner best
suits their interests.
75. See Anthony T. Kronman, Contract Law and Distributive Justice, 89 YALE
L.J. 472, 475 (1979-1980) ("The libertarian theory of contract law is premised upon the
belief that individuals have a moral right to make whatever voluntary agreements they
wish for the exchange of their own property, so long as the rights of third parties are not
violated as a result.").
76. See Richard A. Epstein, Unconscionability: A Critical Reappraisal, 18 J.L. &
ECON. 293, 293-94 (1975) (suggesting that "if one individual is entitled to do within the
confines of the tort law what he pleases with what he owns, then two individuals who
operate with those same constraints should have the same right with respect to their
mutual affairs against the rest of the world").
77. See, e.g., Milton Constr. Co. v. State Highway Dept., 568 So. 2d 784 (Ala.
1990). The decision states:
Since the right of private contract is no small part of the liberty of the citizen,
the usual and most important function of courts of justice is to maintain and
enforce contracts rather than to enable parties thereto to escape from their
obligations on the pretext of public policy, unless it clearly appears that they
contravene public right or the public welfare.
Id. at 788 (emphasis omitted) (quoting 17 AM. JuR. 2D Contracts § 178 (1964));
AFSCMEIowa Council 61 v. State, 484 N.W.2d 390, 394 (Iowa 1992) ("'Freedom of
contract is a basic right, protected under the liberty concept of both the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendment [D]ue [P]rocess [C]lauses."' (quoting 1 ANTrEAu, MODERN
CONSrrUtIONAL LAW § 3:22, at 244 (1969))); Rossman v. 740 River Drive, 241 N.W.2d
91, 92 (Minn. 1976) (stating that "public policy requires that freedom of contract remain
inviolate except only in cases when the particular contract violates some principle which
is of even greater importance to the general public").
78. A number of courts have upheld motorcycle helmet laws on the theory that
third parties are adversely affected when motorcyclists are injured. See, e.g., Simon v.
Sargent, 346 F. Supp. 277, 279 (D. Mass. 1972); State ex rel. Colvin v. Lombardi, 241
A.2d 625, 627 (R.L 1968); see also Comment, Due Process-Statute Requiring
Motorcyclist to Wear Crash Helmet Is Unconstitutional, 82 HARv. L. REV. 469, 471
(1968-1969). For example, spouses and other family members suffer financially and
emotionally when the family wage earner is no longer able to work. In addition, the
III. ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY CONCERNS
Under the current liability regime, judges, juries, and regulatory
agencies determine the acceptable level of product safety. In contrast, a
more contract-oriented liability regime would allow the level of product
safety to be determined, at least to some extent, by market forces.
Ideally, such an arrangement would lead to an optimal level of
investment in product safety based on consumers' willingness to pay.
However, markets do not always operate efficiently. Significant sources
of market failure include: (1) disparities in bargaining power between
buyers and sellers; (2) information asymmetries between sellers and
consumers; (3) cognitive limitations on the part of consumers; and (4)
negative externalities. When any of these conditions presents a serious
obstacle to market operations, the task of changing the current liability
regime becomes particularly challenging.
A. Disparities in Bargaining Power
Monopolistic or oligopolistic conditions are said to prevent markets
from operating efficiently. A pure monopoly exists when only one firm
produces or sells a particular product;7 an oligopoly exists when several
firms compete in manufacturing or selling a commodity.0 While pure
monopolies are rare in this country, a number of industries can be fairly
characterized as oligopolistic, although foreign competition has reduced
their number somewhat in recent years.8' However, even in relatively
competitive market environments, individual consumers may not have
sufficient market power to secure adeqjuate protection against personal
injury through the bargaining process.8 Today, most products are sold
government is forced to provide medical services or disability payments for injured
parties who cannot afford to pay these costs on their own. Of course, this argument
could be used to support almost any type of paternalistic regulation. In this Article's
view, government restrictions on risky conduct can be based legitimately on protecting
third parties from physical harm, but they should not be justified on the basis of
protecting third parties, including the public, from pecuniary losses.
79. See Thomas J. Holdych & George Ferrell, Individual Negotiation of Warranty
Disclaimers: An Economic Analysis of an Assumedly Market Enhancing Rule, 13 U.
PUGET SOUND L. REv. 237, 248 (1990).
80. See THOMAS M. CARROLL, MICROECONOMIC THEORY: CONcEPTs AND
APPLICATIONs 309 (1983).
81. For example, many drug companies have substantial market power because of
patent protection for their products. The cigarette industry is also clearly oligopolistic in
character. See Richard C. Ausness, Compensation for Smoking-Related Injuries: An
Alternative to Strict Liability in Tort, 36 WAYNE L. REv. 1085, 1111 (1990).
82. See Michael B. Metzger, Disclaimers, Limitations of Remedy, and Third
Parties, 48 U. CIN. L. REv. 663, 687 (1979) ("The average consumer generally lacks
substantial bargaining power."); Note, Disclaimers of Warranty in Consumer Sales, 77
HARV. L. REV. 318, 328 (1963-1964) ("The comparative helplessness of the modem
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through marketing arrangements that provide little opportunity for
individual bargaining." Thus, if waivers of tort liability were allowed,
product sellers, instead of competing for consumers' business by
providing meaningful choices, might offer consumers nothing more than
self-serving adhesion contracts that take away existing rights without
giving anything meaningful in return. 4
However, product sellers should not be entitled to trample over the
interests of consumers so easily. In the first place, with the entry of
foreign producers into the American consumer market, there are more
sellers than there were in the past. For example, consumer goods from
such countries as Canada, China, Germany, Great Britain, India, Japan,
Korea, and Mexico are now commonly exported to American markets;
this trend is likely to continue, as the North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFrA) and General Agreement of Tariffs and Trade
(GATT) treaties have opened American markets even farther to foreign
competition.
In addition, thousands of new domestic producers entered the business
force during the last decade. Although many of these companies are
concentrated in high-tech areas, such as computer software, data
transmission, transportation, and biotechnology, new companies have
also entered less glamorous sectors of the economy. While the entry of
additional producers, either foreign or domestic, into American markets
does not guarantee that these markets will operate efficiently, increasing
the number of firms in the economy does tend to lead to greater
competition and consumer choice. Finally, giant retail sellers, like Sears
consumer generally eliminates the possibility of a free and informed choice to assume a
risk, of a course of negotiations which may be evidenced in a contract, or of a true
bargain.").
83. See Kronman, supra note 54, at 770-71 ("Consumer contracts are often
characterized as adhesive, since the consumer has little or no control over the terms of
the agreement.").
84. See Friedrich Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion-Some Thoughts About Freedom
of Contract, 43 COLUM. L. REv. 629, 632 (1943) (declaring that firms with market power
often use form contracts to impose unfavorable terms on weaker parties); William L.
Prosser, The Assault upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69 YALE L.J.
1099 (1960), which states:
Undoubtedly the practice [of offering product warranties] exists, on a large
scale; but it is limited, on the part of almost every one, to replacement, repair,
or return of the purchase price to make good the original bargain; and it does
not extend to compensation for injuries to the person of the buyer, or his other
property.
Id. at 1119.
or Walmart, also provide a degree of protection against unreasonable
exercises of market power by product manufacturers. Unlike individual
consumers, these large retailers have considerable economic leverage.
Since large retail enterprises depend on repeat business, they have an
incentive to maintain a high level of customer satisfaction by selling
safe, high-quality merchandise. Consequently, large retailers can be
expected to resist efforts by manufacturers to degrade product quality or
shift risk excessively to consumers.
Furthermore, recent research, focusing on the behavior of markets
rather than the conduct of individual buyers, indicates that consumers as
a group may have substantial influence over the behavior of product
sellers-even though they have little economic power as individuals."
First of all, consumers can often find meaningful differences in contract
terms among various sellers if they are willing to shop around for the
best deal. Moreover, if enough consumers engage in this behavior to
sustain a competitive equilibrium, other consumers who do not shop
around will also benefit from their efforts because the terms offered to
comparison shoppers will also be made available to all potential
buyers. Finally, it appears that product sellers are generally willing to
create safe and high-quality products if they believe that consumers will
pay for them. 7
Thus, if waivers of tort liability are allowed, it is unlikely that product
sellers will try to force unwanted risks onto consumers. Instead, every
reason exists to believe that product sellers will take advantage of
waivers to offer consumers more choices with respect to risk allocation.
B. Information Asymmetries
In order to make economically rational choices about risk allocation,
consumers must possess complete and accurate information about
product safety. Unfortunately, consumers are often unable to obtain
sufficient information to make intelligent decisions about the products
they buy.88 In contrast, product sellers are familiar with the design and
85. See Duncan Kennedy, Distributive and Paternalist Motives in Contract and
Tort Law, with Special References to Compulsory Terms and Unequal Bargaining
Power, 41 MD. L. REv. 563, 608 (1982) ("Consumers exercise power in the market not
through their conduct during individual transactions, but through the mechanism of
demand, backed by dollars.").
86. See Alan Schwartz & Louis L. Wilde, Imperfect Information in Markets for
Contract Terms: The Examples of Warranties and Security Interests, 69 VA. L. REv.
1387, 1450 (1983) ("Hence, if enough shoppers exist to sustain a competitive
equilibrium, that the nonshoppers do not read is irrelevant; they benefit from the
shoppers' efforts.").
87. See id. at 1414.
88. See James M. Buchanan, In Defense of Caveat Emptor, 38 U. Cm. L. REy. 64,
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quality of their wares and, therefore, can usually predict how dangerous
they will be." However, not only are product sellers reluctant to disclose
what they know about the safety characteristics of their products,0 but
on occasion they have actively misrepresented the quality of their
products to the public.9' Moreover, even when accurate information is
available, consumers often are unwilling to expend the time and energy
necessary to search for it, particularly when they are buying inexpensive
household products.9
These information asymmetries may affect the efficiency and fairness
of contract terms, including waivers. Waivers normally are located
within form contracts and are not subject to negotiation. For consumers,
the purchase of a product is typically a one-shot transaction, and the
costs of closely examining the contract terms will not exceed the
71-72 (1970-1971) ("The complex information required in discriminatory choices among
product qualities is costly to produce, and individuals, as independent buyers, may not be
willing to purchase such information in optimally preferred quantities."); Richard L.
Hasen, Comment, Efficiency Under Informational Asymmetry: The Effect of Framing on
Legal Rules, 38 UCLA L. REv. 391, 392 (1990) (concluding that "the consumer is rarely
in as good a position as the seller to know the pitfalls and dangers of the product"). But
see Alan Schwartz, The Case Against Strict Liability, 60 FORDHAM L. REv. 819, 828
(1992) ("No specific studies establish that consumers have or lack sufficient information
to make optimal decisions respecting product risks.").
89. See Owen, supra note 31, at 711 ("Manufacturers today, especially those of
products that are technologically complex, often are in a far better position than
consumers to discover, evaluate, and act upon, dangers that inhere in the products that
they make and sell."); Marshall S. Shapo, A Representational Theory of Consumer
Protection: Doctrine, Function and Legal Liability for Product Disappointment, 60 VA.
L. REv. 1109, 1289 (1974) (declaring that "producers possess considerable information
about their goods, notably with respect to safety considerations, that is not available to
consumers").
90. See Lindley J. Brenza, Comment, Asbestos in Schools and the Economic Loss
Doctrine, 54 U. Cm. L. REv. 277, 291 (1987) (concluding that manufacturers may be
"unwilling to disclose information from their greater experience with the product to the
consumer").
91. See Thomas A. Cowan, Some Policy Bases of Products Liability, 17 STAN. L.
REV. 1077 (1965). Cowan states:
To put the matter bluntly, a large proportion of mass products are consciously
made as inferior as the traffic will bear and are advertised by conscious
misrepresentation as far superior to their known quality. The combination of
low quality production and high quality lying makes it impossible for those
using the products of mass manufacture to distinguish good merchandise from
bad without the services of a general testing laboratory.
Id. at 1087.
92. See Note, Enforcing Waivers in Products Liability, 69 VA. L. REv. 1111, 1129
(1983).
benefits.93  For sellers, however, the contract, including waiver
provisions, is a repeat transaction upon which sellers will devote
considerable effort and resources.4 Consequently, consumers, deprived
of adequate information about product quality and contract terms, may
be unable to determine whether the level of protection offered by
product sellers is fairly priced or appropriate to their needs.
On the other hand, product safety information is now more readily
available to buyers than it was in the past. For example, government
agencies and private organizations, such as the Consumer Union,
transmit a great deal of information to the public in printed form and
through the Internet. In addition, recent research suggests that
warranties and other contract terms may serve as an indicator of product
quality and safety." This is because a producer whose product is more
reliable than average can afford to offer greater warranty protection than
its competitors because its warranty costs will be lower.9 This enables
consumers to make relatively informed judgments about product quality
simply by looking at warranty terms, even though they have had no
firsthand experience with a particular product.Y The same principle
presumably applies to waivers, which resemble warranties because they
tell us how much confidence sellers have in their products.98 For
example, if Manufacturer A attempted to shift more product-related risks
to buyers than its competitor, Manufacturer B, a consumer would rightly
suspect that Manufacturer A's product was more dangerous than
Manufacturer B's.
93. See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, A Positive Economic Analysis of
Products Liability, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 535, 545 (1985) (stating that it may be inefficient
for a consumer to study a disclaimer when expected damages are low).
94. See Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Limits of Cognition and the Limits of
Contract, 47 STAN. L. REV. 211, 243 (1995) (discussing why sellers invest more than
buyers in sales contracts).
95. See George L. Priest, A Theory of Consumer Product Warranty, 90 YALE L.J.
1297, 1303 (1981).
96. Professor Priest states:
A consumer, however, may look to the warranty as a "signal" of product
reliability because reliability is correlated negatively with the costs of warranty
coverage; that is, the more reliable the product, the lower the costs of warranty
coverage for the manufacturer, and the more extensive the coverage for the
consumer.
Id. (footnote omitted).
97. See id. "Thus, although a consumer has neither experience with nor knowledge
of a product, he may infer its mechanical reliability by inspecting the terms of the
warranty alone." Id.
98. This is not to say that a seller will not resort to double-talk or "legalese" to
obfuscate the true nature of the warranty or waiver they are offering to the buyer.
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C. Cognitive Limitations and Heuristic Biases
Economists typically employ a "rational choice" or "expected utility"
model of decision-making to describe the behavior of consumers in the
marketplace. This model assumes the existence of rational persons who
make choices that are intended to maximize their overall utility.9 When
risk or uncertainty is involved, rational people take into account the
probability of various alternative events occurring.'0° In the real world,
however, rational decision-making is often constrained by the inability
of human beings to process information properly."' These cognitive
limitations cause people to make risk-allocation decisions that are
contrary to the laws of probability or expected utility." For example,
99. See Hasen, supra note 88, at 394. According to Hasen:
The central methodological actor of economics is homo economicus, a
"rational person" possessing complete and transitive preferences. Homo
economicus computes the costs and benefits of alternative choices based on her
personal preferences, which economists take as given and stable over time.
That is, in pursuit of self-interest, she seeks to maximize her subjective
expected utility.
Id. (footnote omitted). Hasen also observes that "[i]n conditions of risk or uncertainty,
homo economicus's subjective view of the probability of an event occurring is calculated
into the making of a decision." Id.
100. See Roger G. Noll & James E. Krier, Some Implications of Cognitive
Psychology for Risk Regulation, 19 J. LEGAL STuD. 747, 750 (1990). Professors Noll
and Krier state that when the various outcomes of an action are uncertain, the action
must be evaluated according to its expected value. The decision maker then identifies
each possible outcome and assigns it a probability. Finally, the decision maker
calculates the expected value, or probability-veighted sum, of all of these possible
outcomes. See id.
According to Hasen, the rational choice model assumes the existence of certain
characteristics about the decision-making process under conditions of risk or uncertainty:
(1) cancellation, (2) transitivity, (3) dominance, and (4) invariance. The cancellation
assumption posits that if event A is preferable to event B, then the probability of event A
occurring is preferable to the probability of event B occurring. According to the
transitivity assumption, if event A is preferable to event B, and event B is preferable to
event C, then event A is also preferable to event C. The dominance assumption posits
that if a particular alternative is preferable to another in one situation and at least as good
as this second alternative in all other situations, then the first alternative should be
chosen. Finally, the invariance assumption holds that rational persons will make the
same choice among various alternatives regardless of how these alternatives are
represented. See Hasen, supra note 88, at 394 n.10.
101. This condition is often referred to as "bounded rationality." Howard Latin,
"Good" Warnings, Bad Products, and Cognitive Limitations, 41 UCLA L. REv. 1193,
1199 (1994).
102. See Eisenberg, supra note 94, at 213 (declaring that "actors characteristically
violate the standard rational-choice or expected-utility model, due to the limits of
cognition"); see also Baruch Fischhoff, Cognitive Liabilities and Product Liability, 1 J.
empirical evidence shows that people frequently overestimate their
ability to manage risk °3 or assume that generally applicable risks will
somehow not apply to them.14 People also tend to reject or discount
information that contradicts preexisting beliefs or biases.' °5 In addition,
many individuals give too little weight to future costs or benefits while
overestimating the value of present costs and benefits. °6 Furthermore,
people tend to disregard very low probability risks' 7 and refuse to take
precautions against them.'
In addition, people use certain decision-making rules, known as
PROD. LIAB. 207 (1977). Fischhoff states that
people have a great deal of difficulty making proper decisions under conditions
of uncertainty, in part because probabilistic processes are counterintuitive, in
part because they lack proper training in decision making, and in part because
they lack the cognitive capacity for combining the large amounts of
information often involved in making decisions.
Id. at 207-08.
This Article's treatment of cognitive limitations and heuristic biases is based largely
on discussions of these subjects in law reviews. Those who wish to peruse the social
science literature should consider looking at some of the following works: JUDGMENT
UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES (Daniel Kahneman et al. eds., 1982);
THOMAS C. SCHELLING, CHOICE AND CONSEQUENCE (1984); HERBERT A. SIMON, 2
MODELS OF BOUNDED RATIONALITY (1982); Paul Slovic et al., Regulation of Risk: A
Psychological Perspective, in REGULATORY POLICY AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 241
(Roger G. Noll. ed., 1985); Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Rational Choices and
the Framing of Decisions, in DECISION MAKING: DEScRwnvE, NORmATVE, AND
PRESCRIPTIVE INTERACTIONS 167 (David E. Bell et al. eds., 1988); Daniel Kahneman &
Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk, 47
ECONOMETRICA 263 (1979); Herbert A. Simon, Rational Decision Making in Business
Organizations, 69 AM. ECON. REv. 493 (1979).
103. See Noll & Krier, supra note 100, at 754 (concluding that "people tend to
underestimate the degree to which their own knowledge and judgments are imperfect").
104. See Jon D. Hanson & Kyle D. Logue, The Costs of Cigarettes: The Economic
Case for Ex Post Incentive-Based Regulation, 107 YALE L.J. 1163, 1186-88 (1998)
(discussing the so-called "third-person effect" in the context of consumers' decisions to
accept the health risks of smoking).
105. See Robert C. Ellickson, Bringing Culture and Human Frailty to Rational
Actors: A Critique of Classical Law and Economics, 65 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 23, 42 (1989)("A person who has established a certain view of the world or of himself may wall out
information that threatens the maintenance of those views."). Social scientists and legal
commentators often refer to this phenomenon as "cognitive dissonance." Latin, supra
note 101, at 1234.
106. See Eisenberg, supra note 94, at 223. Professor Eisenberg refers to this as
"faulty telescopic faculties." Id.
107. See Hanson & Logue, supra note 104, at 1197 (declaring that "below a certain
threshold, consumers discount risks altogether, treating them as if they were zero");
Hasen, supra note 88, at 414 (declaring that "consumers generally mistake low
probabilities for zero probability").
108. See Fischhoff, supra note 102, at 213 ("It also seems as though for most risks
there is some minimum probability of occurrence below which the risk is ignored and no
protective action taken, no matter how cheap it is."); Latin, supra note 101, at 1245
("Social science findings indicate that people often ignore low-probability risks even
when catastrophic harm is threatened if the risks materialize.").
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heuristics, which tend to result in systematic errors."l These include
availability, representativeness, framing, and anchoring heuristics.
When the availability heuristic is applied, one who makes a judgment
about the probability of an event occurring will rely upon similar
comparable events instead of searching for objective probabilistic data.
Consequently, the vividness of an event will often have a greater impact
on the decision than its actual frequency." ° For example, people
wrongly assume that murders are more common than suicides because
murders are more dramatic and receive more media coverage than
suicides."'
The representative heuristic explains why individuals often rely on a
small portion of data, which they consider to be representative of the
whole, instead of basing their decision on all of the available data."2 The
representativeness heuristic often involves reasoning by analogy from
previous experiences." Unfortunately, this may lead to erroneous
conclusions when people treat unduly small samples as representative of
the whole set of data.' 
4
Other heuristics also affect the way people make risk-assessment
descisions. According to conventional rational choice theory,
preferences are supposed to be invariant-a decision to choose one
option over another does not depend on how the choice is characterized
or presented."5  However, empirical studies indicate that the way a
choice is "framed" often affects the decision.H6  For example, when
109. See Eisenberg, supra note 94, at 218 (stating that the use of heuristics leads to
systematic errors in decision-making).
110. See Alan L. Dorris & M.F. Tabrizi, An Empirical Investigation of Consumer
Perception of Product Safety, 2 J. PROD. LIAB. 155, 162 (1978) (suggesting that "it is not
only the actual frequency of occurrence but the drama, publicity and notoriety
surrounding the event which influence subjective judgement"); William N. Eskridge, Jr.,
One Hundred Years of Ineptitude: The Need for Mortgage Rules Consonant with the
Economic and Psychological Dynamics of the Home Sale and Loan Transaction, 70 VA.
L. REv. 1083, 1117 (1984) ("Because of this 'availability heuristic,' useful but
straightforward and bland information may be slighted in favor of flashy, emotive
information.").
111. See Thomas S. Ulen, Cognitive Imperfections and the Economic Analysis of
Law, 12 HAMtNE L. REv. 385, 399 (1989).
112. See Eisenberg, supra note 94, at 222 ("[A]ctors seldom collect all relevant data
before making decisions. Rather, they usually make decisions on the basis of some
subset of the data that they judge to be representative.").
113. See Eskridge, supra note 110, at 1117; Noll & Krier, supra note 100, at753.
114. See Eisenberg, supra note 94, at 222.
115. See Hasen, supra note 88, at 394 n.10.
116. See Noll & Krier, supra note 100, at 753 (concluding that the way "people
asked to choose between a certain loss of fifty dollars and a twenty-five
percent chance to lose two hundred dollars, test subjects preferred a sure
loss when it was described as insurance, but favored a probabilistic loss
when it was characterized as a game of chance."7 Anchoring, on the
other hand, refers to the tendency of individuals to form an initial
impression, or anchor, and then to adjust it in response to subsequent
information." This means that different starting points will yield
different risk estimates that are biased toward the original risk
estimate."9
Naturally, cognitive limitations and heuristic biases affect the way
consumers evaluate product-related risks. For example, consumers who
are excessively optimistic will assume that they can use a product safely,
notwithstanding the existence of known risks. In addition, reliance on
the availability heuristic may cause consumers to underestimate the
seriousness of risks that occur infrequently because they will not be
remembered as well as more frequent events. Moreover, use of the
representativeness heuristic may lead consumers to discount certain
product-related risks. When assessing such risks, people tend to
generalize from their own experiences with the product and, if this
experience has been good, conclude that the product is safer than it
actually is.2  The framing effect may also cause consumers to
underestimate product-related risks because manufacturers ordinarily
choose to frame information and product warnings in a way that
downplays product flaws in order to promote sales.2
Although cognitive limitations are troublesome, they do not pose a
threat serious enough to justify a rule that deprives people of the right to
choose which risks to accept. In the first place, despite the existence of
these cognitive problems, ordinary people still manage to do a relatively
decent job of decision-making on most occasions.'2 Indeed, as
value outcomes depends on how an outcome is characterized or presented").
117. See Fischhoff, supra note 102, at 213.
118. See Ulen, supra note 111, at 400 ("In using this heuristic, people first form an
initial impression, an anchor, and adjust it according to any additional information they
have.").
119. See Latin, supra note 101, at 1237 ("[T]he 'anchoring' heuristic [indicates]
that 'different starting points yield different estimates, which are biased toward the initial
values."' (quoting Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty:
Heuristics and Biases, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY, supra note 102, at 3, 14).
120. See id. at 1231 ("People who generalize from their own experiences may treat
this limited sample as 'representative' of overall product risks and therefore anticipate
continued safety.").
121. See id. at 1241 ("Because manufacturers ordinarily choose to frame
information in product warnings in the manner most conducive to product sales, framing
effects are also likely to contribute to consumer underestimation of product risks.").
122. See Schwartz, supra note 88, at 833 (declaring that "there is substantial
uncertainty respecting whether consumers do misperceive risks and what the effect of
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discussed earlier, other areas of the law recognize the right of individuals
to engage in risk-taking and to waive their legal rights. For example,
spectators and participants in sporting events have always been allowed
to expressly waive their rights under tort law. Likewise, the Uniform
Commercial Code, as well as its statutory and common law
predecessors, have permitted sellers to shift product-related risks to
consumers by disclaiming the implied warranties of merchantability and
fitness for a particular purpose.'"
In addition, denying consumers the right to waive tort liability
interferes with personal autonomy. If our society is committed to the
notion of personal autonomy, it must allow individuals to make
important choices so that they can realize their full potential as human
beings. As mentioned earlier, personal autonomy protects bad choices
as well as good ones. Therefore, unless a transaction results in serious
adverse consequences to a third party or strong evidence exists of fraud
or coercion by the seller, buyers should be permitted to waive tort
liability.
D. Negative Externalities
A negative externality exists when a party fails to take account of the
effects of his or her activity on another." A negative externality occurs
in the context of a market transaction when one party's activities impose
a cost on one not involved in the transaction, and this cost is not taken
into account by the parties involved in the transaction." Two types of
externality problems may arise if buyers are permitted to waive tort
liability. First, one externality problem may result when the seller shifts
product-related risks to the buyer. A second potential externality
problem may occur when the buyer shifts risks to third parties.
The first type of externality resembles the dilemma that supposedly
existed prior to the adoption of strict liability in tort. In the dark days of
laissez-faire, product sellers, secure in the knowledge that they would
likely misperceptions [is]").
123. See U.C.C. § 2-316 (1989).
124. See Coleman, supra note 24, at 231-33.
125. See Raymond E. Gangarosa et al., Suits by Public Hospitals to Recover
Expenditures for the Treatment of Disease, Injury and Disability Caused by Tobacco and
Alcohol, 22 FoRDHi-AM URB. L.J. 81, 103 (1994) ("An externality can be defined as a cost
associated with a market that is absorbed by a party not involved in the market
transaction.").
not be held liable for product-related injuries, showed little interest in
product safety because accident costs were largely borne by consumers.
Arguably, this problem might arise again if consumers were allowed to
waive their rights under tort law. However, since those parties adversely
affected participate in the transaction, this scenario does not meet the
conventional definition of an "externality." Nevertheless, the effect of
this type of contractual waiver is similar to that of an externality because
consumers who sign a waiver without considering the risks of product
failure would lose legal rights.
The second type of externality involves transactions in which product-
related risks are borne by third parties, such as bystanders or employees.
In this circumstance, neither buyers nor sellers have an incentive to
engage in accident cost avoidance because neither bears the costs of
injuries. This scenario demonstrates a true externality. Consequently,
products would be more dangerous than they would be if the parties took
accident costs into account in their dealings.
In terms of the first type of market failure problem, the previous
discussion of disparities in bargaining power and information
asymmetries strongly suggests that product sellers would not be able to
force product risks onto gullible or unwilling consumers. Any risk-
shifting that occurred as the result of waivers would be voluntary. Even
if some consumers underestimate risks because of cognitive limitations,
it is doubtful that this would rise to the level of a serious market failure.
Therefore, negative externality problems would not prove severe enough
to scuttle this proposal.
On the other hand, waivers of tort liability might very well encourage
buyers to externalize product-related risks to third parties such as family
members, bystanders, or employees. As far as family members are
concerned, perhaps it is reasonable to assume that buyers will take their
interests into account when they waive tort liability. However,
bystanders are more troublesome. There is virtually no way for the
parties to take account of their interests within the framework of a sales
transaction. On the other hand, it seems unlikely that a large number of
complete strangers will be injured by defective products. Since the
economic effect of bystander injuries is likely to be minimal, this Article
does not address the impact on this group in its discussion of economic
efficiency.'26
Employees are potentially a much more serious problem than
bystanders. About sixty percent of all personal injury judgments against
126. Corrective justice and distributional effects with respect to bystanders are more
significant and will be discussed below. See infra Part V.A; infra notes 223-30 and
accompanying text.
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product sellers involve workplace accidents."l These claims represent a
major portion of the overall liability that product sellers are exposed to
under the current liability regime. Consequently, product sellers would
probably offer employers significant price concessions in return for
waivers of tort liability that included the claims of injured workers. In
effect, agreements between employers and product sellers could produce
significant externalities by shifting accident costs from sellers to
employees. Unlike bystanders, however, workers may be brought into
the bargaining process since employers and employees could negotiate
the issue of tort liability waivers in their employment contracts. If this
occurred, employers-and ultimately product sellers-would be forced
to internalize at least some of these product-related risks.
IV. LOSS-SPREADING CONCERNS
The goal of accident cost reduction is to minimize all accident costs,
including secondary and tertiary accident costs.'2 For the purpose of
this discussion, secondary accident costs include the economic
dislocation associated with product-related injuries,'29 and tertiary costs
include the costs of administering a particular accident cost avoidance
scheme.3° A number of tort theorists contend that secondary accident
costs can be reduced if primary accident costs are shifted from
individual victims to a large pool of loss bearers.'3' The economic
justification for the concept of loss-spreading is based on the declining
marginal utility of money theory, which assumes that each additional
dollar provides less utility than the previous dollar as a person's wealth
increases.12 If this theory is correct, the overall utility to society will be
127. See George L. Priest, Can Absolute Manufacturer Liability Be Defended?, 8
YALE J. ON REG. 237, 258 & n.84 (1991).
128. See Jennifer H. Arlen, Compensation Systems and Efficient Deterrence, 52
MD. L. REv. 1093, 1096 (1993) ("Under economic theory, the optimal level of risk for
any particular activity is the level at which the total social cost of accidents is
minimized .... ).
129. See Guumo CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF AccIDENTs: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS 27 (1970).
130. See id. at28.
131. See Stanley Ingber, Rethinking Intangible Injuries: A Focus on Remedy, 73
CAL. L. REv. 772, 794 (1985) ("Spreading the impact of loss over time or among a class
of individuals will decrease economic dislocation, thereby reducing secondary costs."
(footnote omitted)).
132. See Guido Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of
Torts, 70 YALE L.J. 499, 517-18 (1961). For more information on the declining marginal
increased if the high-utility dollars lost by accident victims are replaced
by lower-utility dollars provided by members of the loss-bearing pool.
Currently, a number of loss-spreading mechanisms exist. Private
insurers currently provide an array of insurance products, including
health, life, disability, property damage, and liability insurance.
Furthermore, modem workers' compensation statutes require employers
to act as loss spreaders by providing compensation to their workers on a
no-fault basis when they are injured on the job . Finally, government
programs, such as Medicare and Medicaid, perform a loss-spreading role
for veterans, the elderly, and the poor.3M However, many legal
commentators believe that tort law is a better loss-spreading mechanism
because it covers more victims and provides greater protection against
injury. For example, any injured party can bring a tort claim, while
access to private insurance, workers' compensation, and government
health insurance is more limited. Private insurance is available only to
those who can afford it; only workers qualify for workers' compensation
protection; only veterans are eligible to receive veterans' benefits; only
the elderly are entitled to participate in the Medicare program; and
Medicaid benefits are limited to the poor. Moreover, tort law provides
compensation for such intangible losses as pain and suffering, while
private insurance and other loss-spreading schemes generally cover only
pecuniary losses.35
Nevertheless, tort law does not necessarily provide the best approach
to loss-spreading when all factors are taken into account. In terms of
individual coverage for injuries and losses, the tort system seems to
present one clear advantage over other methods of loss-spreading. That
is, any injured party may bring a tort claim. In contrast, access to private
insurance, workers' compensation, and government health insurance is
restricted. However, the vast majority of people have private insurance.
Those lacking insurance generally qualify for some other sort of loss-
spreading program, through work, through service in the armed forces,
or because they are elderly or poor.'36 While some groups, such as
utility of money theory, see Croley & Hanson, supra note 35, at 1794; Herbert
Hovenkamp, Legislation, Well-Being, and Public Choice, 57 U. Cm. L. REv. 63, 70(1990).
133. See Jeffrey O'Connell, Balanced Proposals for Product Liability Reform, 48
OHIO ST. L.J. 317, 320 (1987).
134. See Richard C. Ausness, Paying for the Health Costs of Smoking: Loss Shifting
and Loss Bearing, 27 Sw. U. L. REv. 537, 560 (1997-1998).
135. See Stephen D. Sugarman, Doing Away with Tort Law, 73 CAL. L. REv. 555,648 (1985) (observing that neither social insurance nor workers' compensation nor
private insurance provides compensation for pain and suffering).
136. See Kenneth S. Abraham, What Is a Tort Claim? An Interpretation of
Contemporary Tort Reform, 51 MD. L. REv. 172, 193 (1992) (discussing the types of
private and social insurance that are available to Americans).
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illegal aliens and families of the working poor, do not always receive
adequate coverage, only a relatively small percentage of the population
is completely unprotected against catastrophic loss.'37
Another concern is that most loss-spreading arrangements cover only
direct pecuniary losses.' Tort law provides more generous
compensation, providing not only for pecuniary losses but also for
intangible losses such as pain and suffering. However, this is relevant
from a loss-spreading perspective only if it is economically efficient to
spread nonpecuniary losses. In fact, considerable support exists for the
proposition that it is not efficient to spread such losses by means of
either first-party insurance or tort liability.'39
The argument against insuring against nonpecuniary losses rests on
the notion that insurance is a mechanism for equalizing the expected
marginal utility of money.'4 Those who purchase insurance transfer
money from a pre-loss state to a post-loss state, where it will yield
greater utility.14 However, because they are not pecuniary in nature,
nonpecuniary losses do not affect the marginal utility of money.
Therefore, it will not increase an individual's utility to insure against
such losses.142 For this reason, consumers do not demand that private
insurers provide insurance against nonpecuniary losses. 43
The argument against providing compensation for non-pecuniary
losses assumes that the optimal damage award that an accident victim
should receive is equal to the amount of insurance protection the victim
would be willing to purchase prior to the accident from a private
insurer.' 44 This approach is known as the insurance theory of
137. See George L. Priest, The Continuing Crisis in Liability, 1 PROD. LIAB. L.J.
243, 248 (1989).
138. See Sugarman, supra note 135, at 648.
139. This approach is discussed in Mark Geistfeld, Placing a Price on Pain and
Suffering: A Method for Helping Juries Determine Tort Damages for Nonmonetary
Injuries, 83 CAL. L. REv. 773, 793-96 (1995); David W. Leebron, Final Moments:
Damages for Pain and Suffering Prior to Death, 64 N.Y.U. L. REv. 256, 273-74 (1989);
Ellen Smith Pryor, The Tort Law Debate, Efficiency, and the Kingdom of the Ill: A
Critique of the Insurance Theory of Compensation, 79 VA. L. REv. 91, 99-104 (1993);
Schwartz, supra note 35, at 362-66.
140. See Geistfeld, supra note 139, at 793-96.
141. See id.
142. See id.
143. But see Croley & Hanson, supra note 35, at 1791 (contending that consumers
do want such insurance).
144. See Patricia M. Danzon, Tort Reform and the Role of Government in Private
Insurance Markets, 13 J. LEGAL STuD. 517, 520 (1984) ('The optimal compensatory
award is the amount of insurance the victim would have purchased voluntarily, at the
compensation and suggests that it makes no sense to compensate victims
for nonpecuniary losses. If this is so, loss-spreading mechanisms, like
tort law, that spread nonpecuniary losses are not inherently superior to
loss-spreading mechanisms, like private and public insurance schemes,
that do not spread such losses.
Furthermore, while additional loss-spreading may be desirable, tort
law is a very expensive way to achieve it.'45 The costs of administering
the tort system include the costs of attorneys, insurance personnel, and
expert witnesses, and the expense of maintaining the courts. 46 A 1986
study by the Rand Corporation Institute for Civil Justice estimated the
tort system's administrative costs at $15 billion to $19 billion in one
year.'47 Adjusting for inflation, this figure might well range between $21
billion and $27 billion by now.148  Assuming that products liability
litigation expenses account for roughly ten percent of the tort system's
total administrative costs,' 49 the resulting sum would be $2.1 billion to
$2.7 billion. Another way to measure the administrative costs is to
compare them with the overall amount of money that is paid out to
accident victims. In general, less than half of the money paid by
defendants actually goes to compensate accident victims; the rest is
spent on litigation expenses and attorneys' fees.50 In contrast,
administrative costs are much lower for private insurance, workers'
compensation, and social insurance programs.' All of this suggests that
tort law is a very costly way to spread accident costs. Indeed, the
price implied by the load of the defendant's liability insurance.").
145. See Sugarman, supra note 135, at 596 (stating that "the tort system is
fabulously expensive to operate in comparison to modem compensation systems").
146. See Ackerman, supra note 53, at 687 ("Tort litigation involves not only direct
public expenditures to support the court system, but also expenditures to support the
phalanx of lawyers, insurance adjusters, expert witnesses, and law professors... who are
directly or indirectly sustained by such litigation.").
147. See JAAiES S. KAKALIK & NICHOLAS M. PACE, COSTS AND COMPENSATION PAID
IN TORT LITIGATION at vii-ix (1986).
148. This is assuming an inflation rate of 3% per year for 13 years, for a total
increase of roughly 40%.
149. See Ausness, supra note 36, at 687.
150. See Deborah R. Hensler, Trends in Tort Litigation: Findings from the Institute
for Civil Justice's Research, 48 Omo ST. L.J. 479, 492 (1987) (stating that plaintiffs, on
average, receive about 50% of tort litigation expenditures); Jeffrey O'Connell,
Bargaining for Waivers of Third-Party Tort Claims: An Answer to Product Liability
Woes for Employers and Their Employees and Suppliers, 1976 U. ILL. L.F. 435, 439
(declaring that only 14¢ of every insurance premium dollar reimburses victims of
malfunctioning products for losses not otherwise covered).
151. See Robert E. Litan, The Liability Explosion and American Trade
Performance: Myths and Realities, in TORT LAw AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 127, 135
(Peter H. Schuck ed., 1991) (estimating that administrative costs amount to 30% for
workers' compensation, 15% for private health insurance, and 1% for Social Security
programs).
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administrative costs associated with tort law may very well exceed the
social or secondary accident-cost-avoidance benefits of loss-spreading.
Finally, tort liability is largely unnecessary for those consumers who
already have adequate protection against product-related injuries."
Presumably, these consumers would prefer to accept some or all
product-related risks rather than pay for unwanted protection.'53 It is
unfair to make these consumers pay more for the products they buy in
order to purchase insurance they do not need or to subsidize high-risk
individuals.54
V. CORRECTIVE JUSTICE AND DISTRIBUTIONAL CONCERNS
Under the present system of products liability, product-related
accident costs are shifted from individual victims to manufacturers and
others in the distributive chain. This arguably serves the ends of
corrective justice by placing the burden of compensation on the person
who has caused the loss. However, consumers who waive their right to
compensation under tort law will not be able to shift their losses to
product sellers. Arguably, this would frustrate the goals of corrective
justice. Moreover, even if buyers and sellers as a whole benefitted irom
waivers of liability, the losses associated with such waivers would fall
disproportionately on certain groups.
A. Corrective Justice Concerns
Corrective justice addresses the disposition of wrongful gains and
losses.55 The traditional concept of corrective justice focuses on unjust
152. See Priest, supra note 137, at 248 (arguing that "the compensation insurance
provided by the legal system is largely redundant").
153. See Brenza, supra note 90, at 291 (declaring that "a buyer would prefer to
accept this risk rather than pay a higher price that included some insurance component").
154. See Latin, supra note 101, at 1199 ("It may also be unfair to make safe
consumers, those who choose to create lower risks or can otherwise avoid injuries,
subsidize compensation for unsafe or unlucky product users."); Owen, supra note 31, at
707 (stating that it is neither fair nor efficient "to penalize the prudent consumer who
insures himself through health and wage insurance plans by forcing him to pay again
through higher prices to overinsure himself and also to insure his less prudent
neighbors"); Comment, Strict Products Liability to the Bystander: A Study in Common
Law Determinism, 38 U. Cm. L. Rnv. 625, 637 (1971) ("It is arguably unfair to force all
consumers to pay the increased price when some may wish to purchase 'uninsured'
products at lower prices while those who desire insurance may purchase it privately.").
155. See Ausness, supra note 81, at 1093.
enrichment, where one party gains something directly at the expense of
another.5 6  In such cases, restitution satisfies the requirements of
corrective justice by returning the property to its rightful owner while, at
the same time, depriving the wrongdoer of any ill-gotten gains.'57
According to some theorists, corrective justice also requires those who
engage in wrongdoing to compensate injured parties even when they do
not directly profit from their wrongful acts at the victim's expense.5
Under this definition of corrective justice, for example, a speeding
motorist who negligently injures a pedestrian would be obligated to
compensate the injured party, even though the wrongdoer has not
financially benefited from the victim's injury. The idea is that those
who maximize self-interest by placing others at risk should be required
to compensate those who are injured by their actions.'59
Even though modem products liability law is not fault-based in a
formal sense,"W arguably those who manufacture and sell dangerous
products are in fact guilty of wrongdoing. Therefore, those individuals
have a moral obligation to compensate those they injure. 6' The current
system of products liability is consistent with the requirements of
corrective justice because it forces sellers to restore victims to their pre-
injury state insofar as possible by paying damages. Conversely,
allowing product sellers to escape liability for their wrongful acts
156. See Alan L. Calnan, Distributive and Corrective Justice Issues in
Contemporary Tobacco Litigation, 27 Sw. U. L. REv. 577, 602-03 (1998).
157. See Emily L. Sherwin, Constructive Trusts in Bankruptcy, 1989 U. ILL. L.
REv. 297, 330.
158. See Jules Coleman, Corrective Justice and Wrongful Gain, 11 J. LEGAL STUD.
421,423 (1982).
159. See Richard A. Epstein, A Theory of Strict Liability, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 151,
177-78 (1973). Professor Epstein identifies four causal paradigms that he believes
justify the imposition of liability. The last of these paradigms involves the creation of
dangerous conditions that result in harm to others. This paradigm includes three classes
of dangerous conditions: (1) explosives and other items that are inherently dangerous; (2)
placing an object, not dangerous in itself, in a position where it may do harm; and (3) the
sale of products and other objects that are likely to be dangerous when they are defective.
See id.
160. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A(2)(a) (1965) (stating that
commercial sellers are liable for injuries caused by defective products even though "the
seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his product").
However, it appears that the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS has adopted a negligence
standard with respect to failure-to-warn and design defect liability. See RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LiABIrrY §§ 1-2 (1998); see also David G. Owen, The
Graying of Product Liability Law: Paths Taken and Untaken in the New Restatement, 61
TENN. L. REv. 1241, 1245 (1994) (arguing that "sections 1 and 2 of the new Restatement
define liability as strict for manufacturing defects, but base liability for design and
warnings defects in negligence").
161. See Epstein, supra note 159, at 177-78 (concluding that one who produces and
sells a defective product can be held liable to the victim under principles of corrective
justice).
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arguably undermines the principle of corrective justice.
However, the conventional approach to corrective justice requires that
someone commit a morally wrongful act before that person can be
compelled to provide compensation for an injury.'62 Generally speaking,
though, an otherwise wrongful act cannot give rise to a corrective justice
claim if the victim consents to it.6' The expression "volenti non fit
injuria' ' states this principle eloquently and succinctly. Consumers
have no moral right to compensation if they knowingly and voluntarily
waive their rights in return for lower prices for the goods they buy.
Of course, this analysis does not apply to consumers who have been
coerced or duped into waiving their rights under tort law. Consent
obtained in this fashion is not effective either legally or morally. In
addition, some victims may assert corrective justice claims because they
have not consented in any way to relieve sellers of liability. For
example, children may retain the right to assert a claim based on
corrective justice when injured by defective goods. Unlike adult
victims, children lack the legal capacity to consent to product-related
risks. Even if a child injured by a defective product was a member of
the buyer's immediate family, waivers of tort liability would not
necessarily be imputed to the child.
A similar argument applies to bystanders. The bystander category
includes those who have not purchased or used the product and are not
members of the buyer's immediate family or guests in the buyer's home.
In short, they are strangers who happen to be in the wrong place at the
wrong time. Having neither consented to assume any risks nor benefited
from the buyer's waiver of liability, a bystander may potentially make a
persuasive claim for compensation on corrective justice grounds.
In the absence of an express agreement, employees could also rely on
a corrective justice claim. Like bystanders, employees have neither
waived their rights nor profited from waivers of liability by their
162. Some commentators have suggested that principles of corrective justice might
require one who benefits from a lawful, but dangerous, activity to compensate those who
are injured by the activity, particularly nonparticipants. See Ellen Wertheimer,
Pandora's Humidor: Tobacco Producer Liability in Tort, 24 N. KY. L. REV. 397, 408
(1997) (arguing on corrective justice grounds that tobacco companies should compensate
victims of second-hand smoke).
163. See Ausness, supra note 81, at 1097. Of course, some acts may be sufficiently
reprehensible that they may be sanctioned criminally even if they do not violate the
rights of the victim.
164. This translates to: "He who consents cannot receive an injury." For more on
this expression and its meaning, see BLACK'S LAW DICIONARY 1575 (6th ed. 1990).
employers. At the same time, workers could presumably agree to allow
employers to act on their behalf when they bargain with product sellers.
In such cases, the principle of "volenti non fit injuria" should foreclose a
corrective justice claim by employees if they have authorized their
employer to waive tort liability for product-related injuries.
B. Distributional Concerns
A change from the present tort-based system of products liability to a
more contract-oriented approach may produce a highly skewed pattern
of gains and losses. Product sellers will almost certainly profit from
such a change since they will be able to shift some of their existing tort
liability to their customers. At the same time, ordinary consumers
should also benefit, assuming that the market is reasonably efficient,
because they will share in the gains that will be produced by a more
efficient distribution of risk. On the other hand, certain groups of
affected parties may find themselves worse off if product sellers are
permitted to shift liability for product-related injuries. These potential
losers include: (1) accident-prone adults, (2) young children and
teenagers, (3) bystanders, and (4) employees.
Product sellers, particularly manufacturers, stand to gain if waivers of
tort liability are allowed. First, sellers will benefit from lower litigation
and insurance costs since they will be able to predict their liability more
accurately. In addition, sellers will profit from the fact that they can
shift some of their existing liability to others. Finally, in some cases,
sellers may be able to get away with spending less on product safety.
In theory, consumers will also benefit from waivers of tort liability.
Product sellers cannot compel buyers to waive tort liability, and buyers
will consent to such waivers only when it is in their best interest to do
so. This will occur when buyers have a comparative advantage over
sellers with respect to risk-bearing. Under these circumstances, buyers
may agree to assume product-related risks, but only if sellers provide
price reductions or other benefits that exceed the risks that buyers are
asked to assume. Thus, ordinary consumers will share with product
sellers the efficiency gains that arise from contractual risk-shifting.
Indeed, if market conditions are right, consumers might very well walk
away with the lion's share of these efficiency gains.
Unfortunately, not everyone will be better off if existing products
liability rules are changed to allow buyers to waive tort liability. In
particular, accident-prone adults, children, employees, and bystanders
are likely to be disadvantaged by the establishment of a more contract-
oriented products liability regime.
For lack of a better term, the first group of victims considered consists
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of accident-prone adults. These careless individuals have been known to
injure themselves by ignoring obvious hazards'6 or deliberately
bypassing safety devices.' Foster v. Gillette Co.'67 is illustrative. The
plaintiff in that case purchased a hair spray called "The Dry Look."
After liberally spraying his hair with this highly flammable concoction,
he thoughtlessly lit a cigar.'6 The alcohol in the hair spray thereupon
ignited, severely damaging the plaintiff's hair, as well as other parts of
his body.'69
Daniell v. Ford Motor Co.70 is another classic example. The plaintiff
in the case decided to commit suicide by locking herself in the trunk of
her automobile.' 7' Later, after reconsidering the matter, she attempted to
open the trunk. Unfortunately, the automobile manufacturer had
neglected to provide a latch inside the trunk; consequently, the plaintiff
was forced to spend an additional nine days in the trunk of her car.
7 2
Eventually, the plaintiff was rescued and promptly demanded
compensation from the car manufacturer for her physical and
165. See Todd v. Societie BIC, S.A., 9 F.3d 1216, 1218 (7th Cir. 1993) (parents
ignored explicit warning to keep butane lighter away from children, resulting in fire that
killed 23-month-old child); Uptain v. Huntington Lab, Inc., 723 P.2d 1322, 1322-24
(Colo. 1986) (hospital employee burned by hydrochloric acid in bathroom-cleaning
product after using the product without gloves, contrary to printed warning and oral
instructions from supervisor); States v. R.D. Werner Co., 799 P.2d 427, 428-29 (Colo.
Ct. App. 1990) (plaintiff fell off step ladder because the ladder's back feet were
positioned nine inches below its front feet, contrary to written instructions); Stewart v.
Von Solbrig Hosp., Inc., 321 N.E.2d 428, 432 (Ill. App. Ct. 1974) (plaintiff further
injured when he allegedly walked on broken leg, contrary to doctor's orders); Harris v.
Atlanta Stove Works, Inc., 428 So. 2d 1040, 1042 (La. Ct. App. 1983) (plaintiff injured
by carbon monoxide poisoning when he ignored instructions to vent space heater).
166. See McMurray v. Deere & Co., 858 F.2d 1436, 1438 (10th Cir. 1988) (plaintiff
killed while starting tractor in gear after bypassing starter mechanism); Campbell v.
Robert Bosch Power Tool Corp., 795 F. Supp. 1093, 1095 (M.D. Ala. 1992) (plaintiff hit
in the eye with debris from disintegrating disc after removing wheel guard from electric
sander while not wearing protective goggles); Reed v. John Deere, 569 F. Supp. 371,
373-74 (M.D. La. 1983) (plaintiff who allegedly bypassed starter system killed when
tractor backed over him); McNeely v. Harrison, 226 S.E.2d 112, 113-14 (Ga. Ct. App.
1976) (bystander injured when car owner bypassed safety systems, thereby allowing car
to start while in gear); Wyatt v. Winnebago Indus., Inc., 566 S.W.2d 276, 277-78 (Tenn.
Ct. App. 1977) (plaintiff injured after connecting battery of motor home directly to
starter, thereby bypassing safety systems designed to prevent vehicle from starting while
in gear).
167. 161 Cal. Rptr. 134 (Ct. App. 1979).
168. See id. at 134.
169. See id. at 135.
170. 581 F. Supp. 728 (D.N.M. 1984).
171. See id. at 730.
172. See id.
psychological injuries."
These are by no means isolated cases.174 Numerous other individuals
have injured themselves while engaging in unbelievably stupid acts,
such as diving into shallow swimming pools,73 consuming large
quantities of alcohol, 76 driving recklessly,' " and hunting small game
with rifles while hanging from moving farm machinery. 7  Others have
been injured while speeding down a winding, flood-swollen river in a
bass boat while drunk and without a life vest, 79 lighting a cigarette in a
room filled with propane gas, 80 or riding a motorcycle with the
kickstand down. 8'
173. See id.
174. See Tafoya v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 884 F.2d 1330, 1332 (10th Cir. 1989)(plaintiff injured when riding lawnmower tipped over while traveling along steep hill);
Bingham v. Hollingsworth Mfg. Co., 695 F.2d 445, 447 (10th Cir. 1982) (plaintiff
injured when half-ton pickup truck overturned while towing fully loaded four-ton
fertilizer spreader down steep hill); Wyly v. Burlington Indus., Inc., 452 F.2d 807, 809(5th Cir. 1971) (240-pound college student participating in "National Lap Sitting
Contest" to promote wrinkle-free slacks injured when wooden chair collapsed with 14
co-eds on his lap); Bolduc v. Colt's Mfg. Co., 968 F. Supp. 16, 17 (D. Mass. 1997)
(decedent removed magazine from automatic pistol and shot himself in the head after
having consumed six beers, not realizing that there was a bullet in the chamber); Daigle
v. Audi of Am., Inc., 598 So. 2d 1304, 1305 (La. Ct. App. 1992) (used car shopper
injured after sticking his hand under the hood of a car while engine was running).
175. See, e.g., Fleck v. KDI Sylvan Pools, Inc., 981 F.2d 107, 112 (3d Cir. 1992)(plaintiff dove head first into shallow swimming pool and broke his neck after
consuming five beers and smoking a marijuana cigarette); O'Brien v. Muskin Corp., 463
A.2d 298, 302 (N.J. 1983) (uninvited swimmer injured after allegedly diving into
shallow above-ground pool from roof of adjacent garage); Campbell v. Muswim Pools,
Inc., 537 N.Y.S.2d 412 (App. Div. 1989) (plaintiff killed while attempting to dive into
four-foot-deep above-ground swimming pool).
176. See Pemberton v. American Distilled Spirits Co., 664 S.W.2d 690, 691 (Tenn.
1984) (tippler died after consuming half of a fifth of pure grain alcohol); Brune v. Brown
Forman Corp., 758 S.W.2d 827, 828 (Tex. Ct. App. 1988) (college student died of acute
alcohol poisoning after consuming large quantity of tequila); see also Barnes v. Litton
Indus. Prods., Inc., 555 F.2d 1184, 1185 (4th Cir. 1977) (prisoner went blind after
consuming a bottle of burning alcohol).
177. See Binakonsky v. Ford Motor Co., 133 F.3d 281, 284 (4th Cir. 1998)(unlicensed drunken driver killed when van hit tree and burned); LeBouef v. Goodyear
Tire & Rubber Co., 623 F.2d 985, 988 (5th Cir. 1980) (drunken plaintiff killed when tire
blew out while driving between 100 and 105 m.p.h.); Daly v. General Motors Corp., 575
P.2d 1162, 1164-65 (Cal. 1978) (drunken attorney, driving without a seatbelt, killed
when automobile hit guardrail); Hegwood v. General Motors Corp., 286 N.W.2d 29, 30(Iowa 1979) (plaintiff killed when automobile tire blew out as she was traveling between
110 and 120 m.p.h.); Chart v. General Motors Corp., 258 N.W.2d 680, 682 (Wis. 1977)
(passenger injured when drunken driver lost control of speeding car).
178. See Baker v. International Harvester Co., 660 S.W.2d 21, 22-23 (Mo. Ct. App.
1983).
179. See Norman v. Fisher Marine, Inc., 672 S.W.2d 414, 417-18 (Tenn. Ct. App.
1984).
180. See Andren v. White-Rodgers Co., 465 N.W.2d 102, 104 (Minn. Ct. App.
1991).
181. See Bernotas v. Harley Davidson, Inc., 543 F. Supp. 519,521 (W.D. Pa. 1982).
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Another group that might be disadvantaged is young children and
teenagers. Almost no one would dispute the fact that young children
often exercise bad judgment.'2 Indeed, as Larue v. National Union
Electric Corp."3 illustrates, young children are amazingly adept at
converting the most innocuous household products into engines of
destruction. The plaintiff in the case, an eleven-year-old truant, was
injured while playing with the family vacuum cleaner. His mother left
the vacuum cleaner out in the hallway, plugged in; she also removed the
hood and two of the filters above the fan housing, thereby exposing the
fan"4 While dressed in his pajamas, the boy sat on the vacuum cleaner's
yellow plastic filter support, which rested on a metal casing that covered
the vacuum cleaner's fan and engine, turned the machine on, and
proceeded to "ride" the machine as if it were a horse. '" Unfortunately
for the eleven-year-old, his penis slipped through an opening in the filter
support and into the fan. Sadly, the accident resulted in the partial
amputation of the boy's penis. '86
Numerous other children have been injured as a result of unfortunate
encounters with such common household products as matches,""
cigarette lighters,'88 beer bottles,'89 kitchen utensils,"' household
182. See GARVEY, supra note 39, at 91 ("Children often do things that are dumb,
thoughtless, impulsive, short-sighted, ill-advised, selfish, and screwy.").
183. 571F.2d51 (lstCir. 1978).
184. See id. at 53.
185. See id. The child and his sister had missed the school bus that morning and
were thus home alone. See id
186. See id. However, the experience was not a total loss; a sympathetic jury
awarded Michael $93,750, and this award was affirmed on appeal. See id. at 53, 58.
187. See Bellotte v. Zayre Corp., 531 F.2d 1100, 1101 (1st Cir. 1976) (five-year-old
child who played with matches burned when top of pajamas caught fire).
188. See Floyd v. BIC Corp., 790 F. Supp. 276, 277 (N.D. Ga. 1992) (young child
burned by disposable butane lighter); Kirk v. Hanes Corp., 771 F. Supp. 856, 857 (E.D.
Mich. 1991) (three-year-old child burned when five-year-old brother used disposable
lighter to set fire to her shirt); Bean v. BIC Corp., 597 So. 2d 1350, 1351 (Ala. 1992)
(four-year-old child killed by fire while playing with disposable butane lighter).
189. See Venezia v. Miller Brewing Co., 626 F.2d 188, 189 (1st Cir. 1980) (eight-
year-old child hit in the eye by flying glass after throwing empty beer bottle at telephone
pole).
190. See Kelley v. Rival Mfg. Co., 704 F. Supp. 1039, 1041 (W.D. Okla. 1989)
(eleven-month-old child who pulled crock pot off table injured when contents spilled on
him).
cleaners, 9' furniture polish,"9 and lawn mowers.93 Sometimes, it is the
thoughtless actions of adults that cause children to end up in harm's
way."9' For example, in Erkson v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.,195 a two-year-
old child was injured while riding in a wooden box attached to riding
lawn mower. The box had been constructed by the child's great-
grandparents so that the family dog could ride along when one of its
owners mowed the lawn.96 Alas, while this contraption proved to be an
efficient means of canine locomotion, it turned out to be less effective as
a mechanism for the transport of small children.
Older children are no less likely to be injured than their younger
siblings. For years, airguns,197 firearms, 98 snowthrowers,' 99 dirt bikes, 0
191. See Jonescue v. Jewel Home Shopping Serv., 306 N.E.2d 312, 313 (il. App.
Ct. 1973) (eighteen-month-old child injured as a result of ingesting household cleaner
left out by parents).
192. See Spruill v. Boyle-Midway, Inc., 308 F.2d 79, 81 (4th Cir. 1962) (fourteen-
month-old child died as a result of ingesting furniture polish).
193. See Wenzell v. MTD Prods., Inc., 336 N.E.2d 125, 127 (111. App. Ct. 1975)
(seven-year-old boy, while operating riding lawnmower, knocked down four-year-old
companion and ran over his foot); see also Porter v. United Steel & Wire Co., 436 F.
Supp. 1376, 1378-79 (N.D. Iowa 1977) (five-year-old child injured while trying to climb
into shopping cart); Estabrook v. J.C. Penney Co., 464 P.2d 325, 326 (Ariz. 1970) (six-
year-old boy injured hand while playing on escalator); Simpson v. Standard Container
Co., 527 A.2d 1337, 1339 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1987) (four-year-old child burned while
removing lid from gasoline storage container); Killeen v. Harmon Grain Prods., Inc., 413
N.E.2d 767, 769 (Mass. App. Ct. 1980) (ten-year-old girl injured when she fell down
while sucking cinnamon-flavored toothpick); Brawner v. Liberty Indus., Inc., 573
S.W.2d 376, 377 (Mo. CL App. 1978) (seven-year-old child burned as he removed lid
from gasoline storage container).
194. See Kerr v. Koemm, 557 F. Supp. 283, 284-85 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (three-year-old
child injured after falling off running board of farm tractor); Palmer v. Avco Distrib.
Corp., 412 N.E.2d 959, 961 (Ill. 1980) (eleven-year-old child injured while riding inside
fertilizer spreader); Winnett v. Winnett, 310 N.E.2d 1, 2 (11l. 1974) (four-year-old child
injured when fingers became caught in farm machine conveyor belt); Richelman v.
Kewanee Mach. & Conveyor Co., 375 N.E.2d 885, 886 (Ill. App. Ct. 1978) (two-year
old child injured when she became entangled in grain auger); Jones v. Hutchinson Mfg.,
Inc., 502 S.W.2d 66, 68 (Ky. Ct. App. 1973) (five-year-old child injured by falling off
farm vehicle into grain auger).
195. 841 S.W.2d 207 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992).
196. See id. at 208.
197. See Salvi v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 489 N.E.2d 394, 397 (111. App. Ct.
1986) (plaintiff shot in the eye by fourteen-year-old brother while cleaning air rifle);
Sherk v. Daisy-Heddon, 450 A.2d 615, 616-17 (Pa. 1982) (plaintiff killed by pellet from
air rifle fired by fourteen-year-old companion).
198. See Savage Indus., Inc. v. Duke, 598 So. 2d 856, 856-57 (Ala. 1992) (ten-year-
old hunter injured by shotgun blast after dropping shotgun while climbing tree).
199. See Romanik v. Toro Co., 277 N.W.2d 515, 517 (Minn. 1979) (thirteen-year-
old boy injured hand while operating snowthrower machine).
200. See Sexton v. Bell Helmets, Inc., 926 F.2d 331, 332-35 (4th Cir. 1991)
(thirteen-year-old boy, riding unlicensed vehicle designed solely for off-road use, injured
when he ran into motorcycle on public highway).
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above-ground swimming pools,"' and various other productse have
taken their toll on the teenage population. One of the classic cases of
this particular genre is Moran v. Faberge, Inc.m  In this case, two
teenage girls concluded that they could improve the aromatic qualities of
a lighted candle by pouring cologne on it. This decision proved to be
unwise because the fragrant elixir immediately burst into flames when it
came into contact with the candle.04
When it comes to self-inflicted harm, teenage boys are no slouches
either. For example, in Oden v. Pepsi Cola Bottling Co.,2°5 a young
scofflaw attempted to steal soft drinks from a vending machine by tilting
it toward him. As the plaintiff had discovered from previous criminal
episodes, this maneuver would cause the drink cans to drop out of the
machine.m Alas, in this case, the machine proved to be too heavy for
the plaintiff to handle, and it fell forward and crushed him, thereby
provoking a lawsuit against the machine's manufacturer by this
enterprising thief s estate.00
Employees might also be adversely affected if waivers of tort liability
were permitted. More than half of all personal injury claims against
product sellers are now brought by injured workers.20 Although almost
any product can cause injury in the workplace,21 certain products seem
201. See Klen v. Asahi Pool, Inc., 643 N.E.2d 1360, 1362 (111. App. Ct. 1994)
(fourteen-year-old boy injured while diving off trampoline into four-foot-deep above-
ground swimming pool).
202. See, e.g., Smith v. Holmes, 606 N.E.2d 627, 629-30 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992)
(fifteen-year-old boy suffered brain damage after hanging himself by the neck on swing-
set rope); Moning v. Alfono, 254 N.W.2d 759, 762 (Mich. 1977) (twelve-year-old boy
hit in the eye with slingshot by eleven-year-old companion); Zerby v. Warren, 210
N.W.2d 58, 60 (Minn. 1973) (fourteen-year-old boy died from sniffing model airplane
glue).
203. 332 A.2d 11 (Md. 1975).
204. See id. at 13.
205. 621 So. 2d 953 (Ala. 1993).
206. See id. at 954.
207. See id.
208. See id.
209. See Priest, supra note 127, at 258.
210. See Employers Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Chaddrick, 826 F.2d 381, 382-83 (5th Cir.
1987) (electrical lineman injured by blade on tractor); Blaw-Knox Food & Chem. Equip.
Corp. v. Holmes, 348 So. 2d 604, 605-06 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977) (employee of potato
chip manufacturer injured when he fell into a cooking vat filed with hot oil); Scoby v.
Vulcan-Hart Corp., 569 N.E.2d 1147, 1148 (ll1. App. Ct. 1991) (cook in Mexican
restaurant injured when his arm became submerged in hot oil in a deep-fat fryer);
Colboch v. Uniroyal Tire Co., 670 N.E.2d 1366, 1368 (Ohio Ct. App. 1996) (automobile
mechanic injured when tire he was mounting exploded).
to be particularly dangerous. These include punch presses21 and heavy
machinery,212 forklifts and tractors, 213  cranes,
2 4  conveyor belts,2 5
211. See England v. Gulf & Western Mfg. Co., 728 F.2d 1026, 1027 (8th Cir. 1984)
(worker at automobile mirror manufacturing plant injured hand while operating punch
press); Bullen v. Roto Finishing Sys., 435 So. 2d 1256, 1257 (Ala. 1983) (worker injured
when he caught his arm in an embossing machine); Cavazos v. E.W. Bliss Co., 394
N.E.2d 438, 439 (111. App. Ct. 1979) (immigrant factory worker injured her hand while
operating 22-ton punch press); Scott v. Dreis & Krump Mfg. Co., 326 N.E.2d 74, 77 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1975) (worker injured hand while operating press brake); German v. F.L.
Smithe Mach. Co., 395 N.W.2d 922, 923 (Minn. 1986) (worker injured when leg became
caught in hydraulic press); General Elec. Co. v. Schmal, 623 S.W.2d 482, 484 (Tex. Ct.
App. 1981) (employee killed while inspecting malfunctioning piercing press).
212. See Davis v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 892 F.2d 378, 380-81 (5th Cir. 1990)
(employee at cotton gin factory injured after right hand was caught in lint-cleaning
machine); Venturelli v. Cincinnati, Inc., 850 F.2d 825, 826 (1st Cir. 1988) (sheet metal
worker crushed finger in "plate-shearing" machine); Hagans v. Oliver Mach. Co., 576
F.2d 97, 98 (5th Cir. 1978) (plaintiff's left hand injured by industrial table saw); Elder v.
Crawley Book Mach. Co., 441 F.2d 771, 772 (3d Cir. 1971) (two of worker's fingers
severed by blade on bookbinding machine); Baldwin v. Harris Corp., 751 F. Supp. 2, 4
(D.D.C. 1990) (printing company employee injured hand while operating paper-cutting
machine); Leach v. Jagenberg-Werke A.G., 480 F. Supp. 244, 245 (E.D. Pa. 1979)
(paper company employee injured wrist while attempting to fix malfunction in paper-
coating machine); Cooper v. Bishop Freeman Co., 495 So. 2d 559, 560 (Ala. 1986)
(worker burned arm and hand while operating fabric-pressing machine); Bullen v. Roto
Finishing Sys., 435 So. 2d 1256, 1257 (Ala. 1983) (worker injured when he caught his
arm in an embossing machine); Rahmig v. Mosley Mach. Co., 412 N.W.2d 56, 60 (Neb.
1987) (scrap yard employee injured hand while operating 500-ton guillotine scrap shear
known as "the Monster"); Reid v. Spadone Mach. Co., 404 A.2d 1094, 1095 (N.H. 1979)
(employee of plastics manufacturer lost several fingers when he stuck his hand in
industrial guillotine-type cutting machine); Suter v. San Angelo Foundry & Mach. Co.,
406 A.2d 140, 141 (N.J. 1979) (worker injured when he caught his hand in the cylinders
of a sheet metal rolling machine); Syler v. Signode Corp., 601 N.E.2d 225, 226-27 (Ohio
Ct. App. 1992) (maintenance worker at brickyard injured while attempting to repair
brick-packaging machine); Davis v. Globe Mach. Mfg. Co., 684 P.2d 692, 694 (Wash.
1984) (worker injured while cleaning glue-spreading machine at lumber mill).
213. See Dillinger v. Caterpillar, Inc., 959 F.2d 430, 432-33 (3d Cir. 1992) (driver
of dumpster injured when brakes failed and vehicle rolled over); Rolfes v. International
Harvester Co., 817 F.2d 471, 473 (8th Cir. 1987) (plaintiff run over by tractor after
falling off tractor seat); Mata v. Clark Equip. Co., 374 N.E.2d 763, 764 (Ill. App. Ct.
1978) (employee of food packer injured arm while operating forklift); Marshall v. Clark
Equip. Co., 680 N.E.2d 1102, 1103 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997) (worker injured while operating
forklift); Figgie Int'l, Inc. v. Tognocchi, 624 A.2d 1285, 1288 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1993)
(plant safety director killed while operating "cherry picker" type manlift); Baccelleri v.
Hyster Co., 597 P.2d 351, 352 (Or. 1979) (dockworker injured when forklift backed over
his legs).
214. See Reese v. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co., 303 N.E.2d 382, 383(fll. 1973) (railroad employee killed when "clam shell" bucket fell from crane and struck
him); Suich v. H & B Printing Mach., Inc., 541 N.E.2d 1206, 1209-11 (11. App. Ct.
1989) (air conditioner repairman injured when gantry crane fell on him); Lundy v.
Whiting Corp., 417 N.E.2d 154, 157 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981) (electrician struck by overhead
crane at steel plant); Lutz v. National Crane Corp., 884 P.2d 455, 457 (Mont. 1994)
(worker electrocuted when crane cable came into contact with high-voltage power line).
215. See Alexander v. Conveyors & Dumpers, Inc., 731 F.2d 1221, 1222 (5th Cir.
1984) (mechanic killed while performing maintenance work on conveyor belt in
pharmaceutical plant); Union Supply Co. v. Pust, 583 P.2d 276, 278 (Colo. 1978)
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
chainsaws,216 scaffolding,21 7 construction equipment,28 farm machinery,
219
and toxic or flammable chemicalsYm Although careless employees
account for their share of these work-related injuries,"2 employers also
(worker injured when he caught right arm in "nip point" of conveyor belt at sugar beet
factory); Karabatsos v. Spivey Co., 364 N.E.2d 319, 320 (111. App. Ct. 1977) (United
Parcel employee injured when his arm was caught in cylinders of conveyor belt); Banks
v. Iron Hustler Corp., 475 A.2d 1243, 1244 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1984) (worker injured
when his hand was caught in conveyor belt).
216. See Nettles v. Electrolux Motor AB, 784 F.2d 1574, 1576 (11th Cir. 1986)
(lumberjack injured when chain saw "kicked back" while he was sawing down a tree).
217. See McNeal v. Hi-Lo Powered Scaffolding, Inc., 836 F.2d 637, 638 (D.C. Cir.
1988) (window washer injured when one side of scaffolding dropped because U-clips
had been installed incorrectly); Young v. Up-Right Scaffolds, Inc., 637 F.2d 810, 812
(D.C. Cir. 1980) (carpenter injured when scaffolding fell apart); Jackson v. Harsco
Corp., 673 P.2d 363, 364 (Colo. 1983) (painter injured by collapse of aluminum
scaffolding leg); English v. Crenshaw Supply Co., 387 S.E.2d 628, 629 (Ga. Ct. App.
1989) (construction worker paralyzed from the neck down after falling from scaffolds
that failed); Peterson v. Safway Steel Scaffolds Co., 400 N.W.2d 909, 911 (S.D. 1987)
(building washer injured when scaffold platform gave way); Klein v. R.D. Werner Co.,
654 P.2d 94, 95 (Wash. 1982) (plaintiff fell 25 feet when horizontal scaffolding plank
collapsed).
218. See Huffman v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 908 F.2d 1470, 1472-73 (10th Cir.
1990) (operator of pipelayer machine killed in collision when vehicle's brakes failed on
steep hill); Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Ford, 406 So. 2d 854, 855 (Ala. 1981) (coal miner
killed when earthrioving machine rolled over and crushed him); Shultz v. Linden-
Alimak, Inc., 734 P.2d 146, 148 (Colo. Ct. App. 1986) (construction worker injured
when struck by counterweight on personnel hoist); Niffenegger v. Lakeland Constr. Co.,
420 N.E.2d 262, 264 (111. App. Ct. 1981) (construction worker injured when asphalt-
spreading machine ran over his foot); Strang v. Deere & Co., 796 S.W.2d 908, 909-10
(Mo. Ct. App. 1990) (backhoe operator injured when vehicle tipped over while laying
cable).
219. See Loos v. Farmer's Tractor & Implement Co., 738 F. Supp. 323, 323 (S.D.
Ind. 1990) (plaintiff injured right hand while inspecting engine compartment of
combine); Bates v. John Deere Co., 195 Cal. Rptr. 637, 639-40 (Ct. App. 1983) (operator
of cotton-picking machine injured foot while trying to remove rock from rollers);
Ostendorf v. Brewer, 367 N.E.2d 214, 216 (111. App. Ct. 1977) (farm worker burned by
gasoline which escaped from tractor's fuel tank); Perdue Farms Inc. v. Pryor, 646 N.E.2d
715, 717 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995) (repairman injured lower back while attempting to repair
jammed feed auger at turkey farm); Schuh v. Fox River Tractor Co., 218 N.W.2d 279,
281 (Wis. 1974) (farmer suffered leg injury from crop blower fan).
220. See McCurley v. Whitaker Oil Co., 388 S.E.2d 412, 413 (Ga. Ct. App. 1989)
(worker at steel plant injured from exposure to fumes from trichloroethylene cleaning
agent); Oatis v. Catalytic, Inc., 433 So. 2d 328, 330 (La. Ct. App. 1983) (worker became
disabled after inhaling toxic phosgene gas at chemical plant); Hernandez v. American
Appliance Mfg. Corp., 827 S.W.2d 383, 385 (Tex. Ct. App. 1992) (plaintiff burned while
installing kitchen countertop when flammable formica glue he was using was ignited by
flame from gas water heater).
221. See McNeal, 836 F.2d at 640 (window washers put scaffolding safety clips on
backwards); Employers Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Chaddrick, 826 F.2d 381, 383 (5th Cir. 1987)
(electrical lineman rode on "skidder" even though it was not designed for this purpose);
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contribute to the problem by removing safety equipment from industrial
machineiy,m  failing to transmit warnings to their employees,2 and
tolerating dangerous practices in the workplace.2
Bystanders are another group that might suffer if the current liability
rules were changed. Bystander cases tend to fall into certain patterns.
These include situations that involve driverse or pedestrians "6 who are
struck by motor vehicles, shoppers who are injured by debris from
exploding soft drink bottlese' and other products,2 bystanders who are
Bates, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 640 (employee ignored proper procedures by clearing rock from
cotton-picking machine with foot while machine was running).
222. See, e.g., Baldwin v. Harris Corp., 751 F. Supp. 2,4 (D.D.C. 1990) (employer
disengaged safety device on paper cutter); Germann v. F.L. Smithe Mach. Co., 395
N.W.2d 922, 923 (Minn. 1986) (employer removed safety bar from hydraulic press).
223. See Jones v. Meat Packers Equip. Co., 723 F.2d 370, 372 (4th Cir. 1983)
(employer failed to warn employee that meat grinder might start up even when turned
off); Younger v. Dow Coming Corp., 451 P.2d 177, 179 (Kan. 1969) (employer failed to
pass along warning to employees about danger of exposure to chemicals); Jodway v.
Kennametal, Inc., 525 N.W.2d 883, 888 (Mich. Ct. App. 1994) (employer failed to wam
employees about risk of inhaling cobalt dust).
224. See, e.g., Cook v. Branick Mfg., Inc., 736 F.2d 1442, 1444 (lth Cir. 1984)
(employees at tire-recapping shop routinely failed to use safety pins while inflating
tires).
225. See Passwaters v. General Motors Corp., 454 F.2d 1270, 1272 (8th Cir. 1972)
(motorcyclist cut by exposed decorative flanges on hubcap of car during collision);
Williams v. National Trailer Convoy, Inc., 549 F. Supp. 305, 306 (D. Colo. 1982)
(plaintiff's vehicle struck when mobile home being towed on highway crossed over into
plaintiff's lane); Sullivan v. Green Mfg. Co., 575 P.2d 811, 813 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1977)
(plaintiff's vehicle struck by truck pulling loaded cotton trailer that could not stop in time
because of inadequate brakes); Caruth v. Mariani, 463 P.2d 83 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1970)
(brake failure caused automobile to hit plaintiff's car in the rear); Elmore v. American
Motors Corp., 451 P.2d 84, 85 (Cal. 1969) (when driveshaft came loose automobile went
out of control and struck plaintiff's car); Bradford v. Bendix-Westinghouse Automotive
Air Brake Co., 517 P.2d 406, 409 (Colo. Ct. App. 1973) (brake failure caused dump
truck to run into plaintiffs car); Martin v. Ryder Truck Rental, Inc., 353 A.2d 581, 582
(Del. 1976) (brakes on rented truck failed, causing truck to run into rear end of plaintiff's
car as it was stopped at an intersection); Chrysler Corp. v. Alumbaugh, 342 N.E.2d 908,
911 (Ind. Ct. App. 1976) (while traveling on highway, plaintiff's vehicle struck by
another automobile that in turn had been hit by a pickup truck whose brakes had failed);
Hampshire v. Ford Motor Co., 399 N.W.2d 36, 37 (Mich. Ct. App. 1986) (driver of
stolen car crossed over center line and struck plaintiff's vehicle); Osborne v.
International Harvester Co., 688 P.2d 390, 393 (Or. Ct. App. 1984) (plaintiff injured
when she collided with truck that had broken down in the wrong lane of traffic); Darryl
v. Ford Motor Co., 440 S.W.2d 630, 631 (Tex. 1969) (defective brakes caused truck to
run into rear of plaintiff's car).
226. See West v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 336 So. 2d 80, 82 (Fla. 1976) (road grader
backed into and ran over plaintiff as she was crossing the street); Haumersen v. Ford
Motor Co., 257 N.W.2d 7, 10 (Iowa 1977) (seven-year-old boy killed when automobile
went out of control in school yard); Ford Motor Co. v. Cockrell, 211 So. 2d 833, 834
(Miss. 1968) (dump truck spontaneously started up and pinned plaintiff against another
truck).
227. See Embs v. Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co., 528 S.W.2d 703, 704 (Ky. Ct. App.
1975) (soft drink bottle sitting on floor exploded, injuring plaintiff as she was removing
soft drinks from self-service cooler).
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hurt by objects ejected by power tools,' repairmen who are injured
while attempting to fix defective products °0 children who come into
contact with dangerous machinery, and those who come to the rescue
of others in peril2
2
Each of these categories of potential victims could argue that allowing
waivers of tort liability would be unfair because it would cause them to
bear a disproportionate share of any harm that results. Each of these
claims will be addressed separately. Accident-prone adults probably
have the weakest argument for special treatment. They are not a very
sympathetic lot, and it seems unfair and paternalistic to deprive buyers
and sellers of the benefits of rational decision-making in order to protect
mature adults from the consequences of their foolish behavior.
Young children and teenagers seem to have a stronger claim for
compensation than accident-prone adults. One reason is that they are not
as morally culpable as adults. Unlike adults, the bad judgment of young
children, and even teenagers, is usually due to inexperience and lack of
maturity rather than carelessness or indifference. Thus, it is easier to
view children as morally innocent and more deserving of protection than
adults. However, one might argue that children and teenagers are part of
a family unit. When a member of the family, typically a parent,
purchases a product and waives tort liability in return for a lower price,
the entire family benefits financially from this transaction and, therefore,
should be bound by its terms. Under this reasoning, waivers would be
228. See Moss v. Polyco, Inc., 522 P.2d 622, 624 (Okla. 1974) (container of drain
cleaner spilled on plaintiff while she was using steak house's restroom).
229. See Sills v. Massey-Ferguson, Inc., 296 F. Supp. 776, 778 (N.D. Ind. 1969)
(customer at automobile dealership struck in the jaw by bolt thrown by lawnmower).
230. See Skarski v. Ace-Chicago Great Dane Corp., 485 N.E.2d 1312, 1314 (111.
App. Ct. 1985) (plaintiff injured while trying to repair refrigeration unit attached to
trailer).
231. See Karns v. Emerson Elec. Co., 817 F.2d 1452, 1454 (10th Cir. 1987)
(thirteen-year-old boy's arm cut off by circular saw blade on bush cutter operated by his
uncle); Komanekin v. Inland Truck Parts, 819 F. Supp. 802, 805 (E.D. Wis. 1993) (five-
year-old boy severely injured when his arm became entangled in the moving drive-shaft
of a propane gas delivery truck); Howes v. Hansen, 201 N.W.2d 825, 826 (Wis. 1972)
(two-year-old child injured by power riding lawnmower).
232. See Fedorchick v. Massey-Ferguson, Inc., 438 F. Supp. 60, 61 (E.D. Pa. 1977)
(plaintiff struck by runaway earth loader while attempting to rescue driver who was
thrown from vehicle), affd without opinion, 577 F.2d 725 (3d Cir. 1978); Court v.
Grzelinski, 379 N.E.2d 281, 282 (11. 1978) (fireman injured while trying to extinguish
fire in another's automobile); Otis Elevator Co. v. Wood, 436 S.W.2d 324, 326 (Tex.
1968) (plaintiff injured while reaching over escalator handrail to help small child who
had fallen down on escalator).
effective against children as well as adults.
Employees arguably deserve protection from unilateral decisions by
their employers that subject them to increased risk. However, in many
instances workplace safety issues are negotiated between employers and
employees or their representatives. In such cases, one can argue that
employees voluntarily agree to accept greater risks and presumably get
something in return from their employer for doing so.
Of all these groups, bystanders most clearly occupy the moral high
ground. Unlike accident-prone adults, bystanders are seldom at fault,
and when they do fail to look out for themselves properly, they are
subject to liability under the comparative fault doctrine. Furthermore,
unlike children, bystanders seldom benefit, even indirectly, from risk-
shifting arrangements between buyers and sellers. Finally, unlike
employees, bystanders cannot be viewed as having consented to waivers
of tort liability by others acting in their stead.
VI. SOURCES OF LEGAL AND PRACTICAL PROTECTION
FOR CONSUMER INTERESTS
Some may feel that the liability regime described above gives buyers
and sellers too much freedom to determine who will bear the
consequences of product-related risks. These skeptics may doubt that an
unregulated market can assure the maintenance of an acceptable level of
product safety, or they may feel uncomfortable with the distributive
effects of a system that enables sellers to shift virtually all product-
related risks to consumers. Assuming these concerns are valid, they may
be lessened by the existence of a number of mechanisms that protect
consumer interests. For example, federal regulations already establish a
minimum level of safety for virtually all products. In addition,
legislatures and courts have the power to employ a variety of techniques
to control overreaching by product sellers. Finally, a number of
practical considerations effectively limit a product seller's ability to shift
product-related risks to customers.
A. Federal Product Safety Standards
At the present time, federal agencies regulate many aspects of product
safety.u3' For example, the Consumer Product Safety Commission
promulgates safety standards for consumer productse and administers
233. See generally Richard C. Ausness, The Case for a "Strong" Regulatory
Compliance Defense, 55 MD. L. REv. 1210, 1214-17 (1996) (describing the regulatory
responsibilities of various federal agencies).
234. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 2051-2084 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
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certain "transferred acts," such as the Flammable Fabrics Act,2" the
Child Protection and Toy Safety Act of 1969,23' and the Poison
Prevention Packaging Act of 1970.7.7 The Environmental Protection
Agency, acting under the auspices of the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide,
and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA), oversees the manufacture, sale, and use
of pesticides and herbicides.'s The National Traffic and Motor Vehicle
Safety Act of 1966 authorizes the Secretary of Transportation to
establish safety standards for automobiles and other motor vehicles. 29
Consequently, Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards currently govern
many aspects of motor vehicle safety.' "  The Food and Drug
Administration is empowered by the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic
Act and the Public Health Service Act to regulate the development,
testing, manufacture, and sale of chemical drugs, biological products,
and medical devices.' In addition, the Department of Agriculture
regulates the processing of such food products as meat,24 2 poultry,24 3 and
eggs. 244 The Federal Aviation Administration has promulgated safety
standards for commercial and private aircraft pursuant to the Federal
Aviation Act of 1958.24 Finally, the Department of Labor is authorized
by the Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA) to formulate
occupational health and safety standards, including safety standards for
industrial machinery.2"
Although some commentators maintain that these standards are
inadequate or obsolete,247 the existing network of federal regulations
235. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1191-1204 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
236. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1261, 1262, 1274, 1278 (1994).
237. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1471-1474, 1476 (1994).
238. See 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136y (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
239. See 49 U.S.C. §§ 30101-30162 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
240. See Stephen J. Werber, The Products Liability Revolution-Proposals for
Continued Legislative Response in the Automotive Industry, 18 NEW ENG. L. REv. 1, 46
(1982-1983).
241. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-394 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998); 42 U.S.C. § 262 (1994 &
Supp. IV 1998).
242. See Federal Meat Inspection Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 601, 611 (1994 & Supp. IV
1998).
243. See Poultry Products Inspection Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 451,457 (1994).
244. See Egg Products Inspection Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 1031, 1036 (1994).
245. See 49 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1557 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
246. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
247. See Anita Johnson, Products Liability "Reform": A Hazard to Consumers, 56
N.C. L. REv. 677, 687 (1977-1978) ("Manufacturers have enormous power to influence
the formation of government standards."); Teresa Moran Schwartz, The Role of Federal
Safety Regulations in Products Liability Actions, 41 VAMD. L. REV. 1121, 1147 (1988)
provides some level of protection for consumers. Of course,
manufacturers must comply with applicable product safety standards,
and consumers are not permitted to waive them. Thus, for products that
are subject to federal safety standards, waivers of liability can only affect
risks that lie between the floor established by federal law and the ceiling
established by tort liability. This assures that even the most aggressive
use of waivers by product sellers will not return us to the brutal days of
caveat emptor.
B. Clear Statement Requirements and Other Formalities
If legislatures or courts are concerned about the effects of unrestricted
use of waivers in sales agreements, they could establish requirements
that would provide additional protection to consumers. For example,
they could subject waivers of tort liability to some of the same
requirements that currently exist for disclaimers under the Uniform
Commercial Code. For example, section 2-316 requires that disclaimers
of the implied warranty of merchantability be "conspicuous" and refer
expressly to merchantability.2S Courts will not enforce disclaimers that
fail to comply with these requirements. 9  Disclaimers of fitness
warranties must also be conspicuous, although they need not specifically
mention fitness."'
Reasonably clear statement requirements and other formalities would
work just as well under a hybrid tort-contract regime as they do under
the Code's contract-oriented regime. These requirements would protect
consumers by alerting them to the fact that the seller has limited its duty
in some way, thereby preventing sellers from slipping exculpatory
language past consumers by placing it where consumers are unlikely to
see it.
(discussing how regulated industries affect safety standards by controlling the agency's
access to information); Mark DeSimone, Comment, The State of the Art Defense in
Products Liability: "Unreasonably Dangerous" to the Injured Consumer, 18 DuQ. L.
REV. 915, 923 (1980) ("[G]ovemment regulations which may have been adequate when
originally enacted are often obsolete and fall well below the level of safety needed for
products manufactured at a later date.").
248. U.C.C. § 2-316(2) (1989).
249. See Agristor Leasing v. Guggisberg, 617 F. Supp. 902, 909 (D. Minn. 1985)(holding that disclaimer on back of sales contract was not conspicuous); Agrarian Grain
Co. v. Meeker, 526 N.E.2d 1189, 1192 (Ind. Ct. App. 1988) (declaring disclaimer to be
ineffective for failure to mention merchantability); P.E.A.C.E. Corp. v. Oklahoma
Natural Gas Co., 568 P.2d 1273, 1278 (Okla. 1977) (refusing to enforce disclaimer
which failed to mention merchantability); Christopher v. Larson Ford Sales, Inc., 557
P.2d 1009, 1012 (Utah 1976) (concluding that disclaimer on back of contract for sale of
mobile home was not effective because it was not conspicuous).
250. See U.C.C. § 2-316(2) (1989).
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C. Categorical Restrictions on Waivers
Legislatures or courts could also expressly prohibit waivers that they
deem to be inherently unfair to consumers or otherwise offensive to
public policy. Although this power should be used sparingly,
legislatures or courts could provide that waivers of liability would not
apply to children, bystanders, or workers, unless the right to waive
workers' fights under tort law had been addressed in a labor contract.
They could also prohibit caps on compensatory damages or ban
provisions that reduced the time limit for filing claims. Legislatures or
courts, if they chose, could even prevent the sellers of certain types of
essential consumer products, such as food or drugs, from offering tort
liability waivers at all.
D. The Unconscionability Doctrine
Finally, courts could refuse to enforce any waivers of tort liability that
they found to be "unconscionable." Courts have traditionally employed
the unconscionability doctrine in contract cases. This principle has been
codified in section 2-302(1) of the U.C.C.2' and has even been applied to
invalidate disclaimers that fully complied with the formal requirements
of the Code.22 Presumably, courts could invoke the unconscionability
principle to strike down unfair or one-sided waivers of tort liability as
well.
E. Practical Limitations
In addition to formal legal restrictions, practical limitations affect the
ability of sellers to limit their liability for defective products. First, the
requirement that the terms of a waiver be specific and must be
251. This provision declares:
If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any clause of the
contract to have been unconscionable at the time it was made the court may
refuse to enforce the contract, or it may enforce the remainder of the contract
without the unconscionable clause, or it may so limit the application of any
unconscionable clause as to avoid any unconscionable result.
Id. § 2-302(1).
252. See Martin v. Joseph Harris Co., 767 F.2d 296, 301-02 (6th Cir. 1985)
(concluding that exculpatory provisions placed in sales contracts by cabbage seed
producers were unconscionable); Schmaltz v. Nissen, 431 N.W.2d 657, 661-62 (S.D.
1988) (invalidating exculpatory provisions in seed sales contract on unconscionability
grounds).
communicated to the buyer will create insurmountable obstacles for
many sellers. Since face-to-face bargaining is generally impracticable,
sellers would have to transmit waiver provisions to buyers by means of
sales contracts, package labeling, or package inserts. However, these
methods of communication are not always effective. For example,
formal contracts are seldom used in connection with the sale of
inexpensive consumer products that are purchased in supermarkets or
discount stores. The only documents that these types of sellers provide
are computer-generated sales slips that, at best, describe the item sold
and give its price. In theory, the seller could set forth the terms of the
waiver on the product itself or on package labeling. However, many
consumer products are too small to allow package labeling to serve as a
practical means of notifying consumers of the existence of a waiver.
Obviously, a manufacturer would have to use very small print indeed to
set forth the terms of a waiver on a product package that was only a few
inches long or wide. Moreover, if such labeling were used, courts would
almost certainly conclude that the small print failed to provide proper
notice to the consumer of the terms of the waiver provision. Package
inserts might provide more information to consumers and could also
employ larger print. However, courts might refuse to give effect to
waivers contained in package inserts if consumers could not read them
until after they had purchased the product.
As a practical matter, the requirement that sellers provide full
disclosure of waiver terms makes it difficult or impossible for sellers to
obtain waivers of tort liability unless the products involved are fairly
large and expensive. For this reason, contractual waivers of tort liability
will probably not be used very often in connection with the sale of
inexpensive consumer products, even though they may be dangerous.
Furthermore, marketing considerations may also discourage sellers
from attempting to limit their liability. Just as consumers view strong
warranties as an indicator of good product quality, they are also likely to
view waivers as a tacit acknowledgment by the seller that the product is
poorly made or dangerous. Consequently, sellers who demand waivers
of tort liability may lose market share, particularly if their competitors
employ more consumer-oriented marketing strategies. Therefore, it
appears that only those sellers who are willing to give their customers a
genuine benefit in return for waiving tort liability are likely to benefit in
the long run from the use of waivers.
VII. CONCLUSION
This Article has argued that buyers and sellers should be allowed to
shift product-related risks through the use of contractual waivers of tort
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liability. These contractual agreements could relieve the seller of all
liability, they could partially waive liability, or they could limit the
remedies that would otherwise be available to accident victims. Such
arrangements are economically efficient because they ensure that
product-related risks will be borne by the party with the best ability to
bear these risks. Allowing people to determine who should bear such
risks is also consistent with the principle of personal autonomy.
Additionally, this Article has attempted to respond to some of the
concerns generated by this proposal. For example, market failures might
impair the ability of a market-oriented system to achieve economic
efficiency. In addition, the loss-shifting function of products liability
might be undermined if sellers were able to shift accident costs to
individual buyers instead of spreading them to the consuming public.
Finally, shifting losses from sellers to consumers might offend principles
of corrective justice, and these losses might fall disproportionately on
certain groups of victims.
While these concerns are legitimate, they are not significant enough to
forego the benefits that will accrue if waivers of tort liability are
permitted. First, as this Article has demonstrated, the fear of market
failure has been exaggerated. In addition, buyers can often bear risk
more efficiently than sellers. Furthermore, distributional and corrective
justice concerns can be addressed by placing modest limits on the right
to waive tort liability rather than by prohibiting such waivers altogether.
Finally, this Article has identified a number of legal and practical
considerations that effectively limit the ability of sellers to shift
excessive risk to consumers.
All of this leads to the conclusion that the paternalism of existing
products liability law should be repudiated. Additionally, buyers and
sellers should be allowed to determine for themselves who should bear
the risks associated with the manufacture and use of products.
